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ABSTRACT 
Today, individuals network and interact with each other in radically different ways 
by using social networking sites, such as Facebook and Twitter. Utilizing this new 
media, individuals are able to share intimate details of their lives, coordinate 
activities, and exchange ideas with friends, family and others in ways previously 
accomplished only in person, by telephone, or in written letters stored at home. 
At the same time, terrorist organizations and other criminal actors are 
increasingly utilizing social networking sites, for both recruiting purposes and for 
the planning, financing, and execution of nefarious acts. As such, social networks 
have become a valuable source of intelligence for the law enforcement and 
intelligence communities that enable the collection of information pertaining to 
individuals in ways not previously possible. However, the law pertaining to 
surveillance in cyberspace has failed to keep pace with society’s adoption of 
social networking and other cloud computing technologies. This thesis examines 
the privacy and civil liberties safeguards inherent in the Fourth Amendment and 
the need to ensure that an appropriate balance is struck between an individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy in online communications and the 
government’s information gathering requirements necessary to combat emerging 
criminal and terrorist threats. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Today, individuals, particularly those in the younger generations, network 
and interact with each other in radically different ways than prior generations by 
using online social networking tools, such as Facebook, Twitter and, Google+. 
These new technologies enable individuals to share intimate details of their lives, 
coordinate activities, and exchange ideas with friends, family and others in ways 
previously accomplished only in person, and perhaps more limitedly, by 
telephone or in written letters. At the same time, social networking sites are 
increasingly being utilized by terrorist entities for recruiting planning, financing 
and execution of terrorist acts, 1  as well as by individuals engaged in other 
criminal ventures. As such, the Internet has become a valuable source of 
intelligence for the law enforcement and intelligence communities that enables 
the collection of information on individuals in ways not previously possible. With 
the advent of social networking technologies, the ability to track an individual’s 
activities online has increased exponentially. However, existing privacy and civil 
rights law has failed to keep pace with advancements in technology, which 
leaves individuals with little to no “reasonable expectation of privacy” nor legal 
protections of their communications occurring in social media or other cloud 
computing tools. It is becoming increasingly critical to update pertinent laws or 
adopt online privacy principles that establish an appropriate balance between the 
government’s surveillance needs and an individual’s privacy and civil liberties 
interests. 
To gain a proper understanding of an individual’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy in today’s digital world, it is important to understand the development 
of privacy as a cherished value and as a civil right in the United States. The 
framers of the Constitution enacted the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution to 
                                            
1 EUROPOL, TE-SAT 2010: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, 2010, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/TE-SAT%202010.pdf. 
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protect individuals from unwarranted governmental intrusion of homes and 
personal affects without the issuance of a warrant premised upon probable cause. 
Interestingly, the Constitution does not contain the word privacy nor does it 
expressly provide protections for individual privacy rights, as they have become 
known today, in large part because the framers could not have imagined the 
technology that exists today (or even the technology that existed 100 years ago) 
and the potential for widespread governmental intrusion. Thus, no conception of 
the need to create Constitutional protections for other than personal and physical 
property existed.  
The right to individual privacy as a concept has evolved and continues to 
evolve through the development of common law, the passage of federal statutes, 
and societal expectations. Advancements in communication technologies have 
far outpaced existing laws that enable governmental access to an individual’s 
digital communications and other personal data stored in the cloud, with little or 
no judicial oversight. Today, the ability to control access to communications and 
other online activities, and to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusions 
in cyberspace, has been greatly compromised. 
At the same time, terrorist and other criminal actors are using digital 
technologies to plan, recruit, and raise funds, and to execute their nefarious aims, 
which make their communications a valuable source of intelligence for those 
governmental entities entrusted with keeping this country safe. As the law 
enforcement and intelligence communities see the need for increased online data 
collection, the tension between privacy and civil liberties on the one hand, and 
information gathering and sharing on the other, is growing, which is highlighting 
the need for a significant reevaluation of the Fourth Amendment’s protections.  
Privacy and civil liberties are at a crossroads. Will Constitutional 
protections against unwarranted search and seizures, previously enjoyed by 
individuals utilizing traditional means of communication, apply to their digital 
communications? As Microsoft Associate General Counsel Mike Hintze stated, 
“[m]any Americans take for granted the protections of the Bill of Rights that 
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prevent the government from coming into people's homes without a valid search 
warrant. The rise of cloud computing should not diminish these privacy 
safeguards.”2 As individuals begin to migrate more of their communications and 
information into the cloud, it is imperative that an appropriate balance be struck 
between privacy and civil liberties of the individual, with the post-September 11 
intelligence gathering needs of the law enforcement and Intelligence 
communities tasked with keeping the United States safe from additional acts of 
terrorism and other harm.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What are an individual’s reasonable expectations of privacy in 
concerning digital communications occurring in social media or 
stored in the cloud?  
2. How can we determine what is the correct balance is between an 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy and the law 
enforcement and intelligence communities’ lawful ability to collect 
information it needs to protect this country from emerging criminal 
and terrorist threats and how can the balance be achieved? 
3. How should the Electronic Communications Privacy Act be 
amended to strike an appropriate balance between today’s evolved 
expectations of privacy with the law enforcement and intelligence 
communities’ efforts to protect the United States, which 
incorporates traditional notions of due process, civil liberties and 
judicial oversight? 
4. How can internal policies be implemented by the law enforcement 
and intelligence communities, and by third party service providers, 
to afford Fourth Amendment like protections to individuals in the 
absence of clear legal standards? If so, what oversight 
mechanisms should be put in place to ensure compliance? 
C. METHODOLOGY 
Development of a legal and policy archetype that strikes a balance 
between an individual’s civil liberties and privacy, and the intelligence and law 
enforcement communities’ post-September 11 surveillance needs requires an 
                                            




understanding of the current state of the law. It is essential to understand the 
evolution of the application of the Fourth Amendment as it existed in the early 
days of this country, as it evolved with the advent of new communications 
mediums, such as the telegraph and the telephone, and as it is applied today 
when intimate details of an individual’s personal, religious and political life are 
communicated and stored outside that person’s physical custody, by third parties, 
in cyberspace. This analysis focuses on privacy and civil liberties safeguards 
provided by the Constitution and those conferred by statutes, such as the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act enacted in the early days of the Internet. 
In particular, it is important to understand the shortcomings of this technology 
centered statute, and how it fails to address privacy considerations associated 
with new and emerging social networking and cloud computing technologies. 
This policy analysis includes: 1) an examination of the evolution of law as 
it relates to an individual’s privacy and civil rights in his communications; 2) an 
examination of the current state of the law as it relates to an individual’s privacy 
and civil liberties in communications occurring in social media and stored in cloud 
computing services; 3) applicable standards for the law enforcement and 
intelligence communities seeking to engage in the surveillance of an individual’s 
electronic communications; 4) an examination of an individual’s expectation of 
privacy in electronic communications and methods individuals employ to assert 
control over their information in cyberspace; and 5) options for the reform of the 
current law or the formation of policy to provide clear and consistent standards 
for surveillance in cyberspace while extending Fourth Amendment like 
protections to an individual’s digital conduct. 
The evolution of Constitutional law pertaining to the surveillance of 
electronic communication has resulted in a patchwork of inconsistent outcomes. 
An analysis of the principal Supreme Court cases interpreting the Fourth 
Amendment and the protections afforded to an individual and personal 
communications is conducted. In particular, the implications of the judicially 
created “Third Party Doctrine” that negates the “reasonable expectation of 
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privacy” when an individual entrusts information to another is considered. The 
Third Party Doctrine has become extremely problematic in the modern world, in 
which an individual regularly provides financial information to banks and online 
merchants and/or uses a mobile communication device to post messages on 
Facebook. 
Further, an analysis of the Electronic Communication Privacy Act (ECPA) 
of 1986 is undertaken. ECPA was Congress’ attempt to remedy the limitations on 
an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy imposed by the Third Party 
Doctrine and provide Fourth Amendment like protections to communications 
occurring on the Internet. These protections include an examination of the 
technology centric provisions of the act to determine how they apply to today’s 
social networking technologies and whether the statute still provides meaningful 
safeguards for an individual and personal electronic communications. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A WAY FORWARD 
Privacy and civil liberty protections may be afforded through the adoption 
of policy guidance by law enforcement and intelligence communities, as well as 
by a third party service provider. Existing policies are examined to determine 
whether governmental efforts to impose internal standards, such as those 
contained in a 1999 Department of Justice guidance on the use of the Internet for 
criminal intelligence gathering, have been effective in ensuring that privacy and 
civil liberties are afforded to users of social networking and cloud computing 
technologies.  
  6
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION  
How an individual’s privacy and civil liberties are balanced against the law 
enforcement and intelligence communities’ need to detect and deter emerging 
threats as communicated in cyberspace is the subject of a growing debate being 
conducted in literature, in U.S. courts and legislature and in popular discourse. 
Today, in cyberspace, an individual engaging in a conversation with friends has a 
limited expectation of privacy, even if it occurs in private, with all privacy settings 
elected, and in particular, when none of the friends have consented to the 
release of the information. With more and more personal information being 
communicated electronically in social networking sites (a form of cloud 
computing) and stored outside of homes in the cloud, the nature of an individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy in cyberspace is the subject of a growing body 
of literature that includes an analysis of the Fourth Amendment, judicial decisions 
interpreting the boundaries of an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the new digital environment, and interpretations of a number of federal statutes. 
Of particular interest to the discussion of an individual’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy and the appropriate standard for access by the law enforcement and 
intelligence communities is ECPA, a 1986 statute enacted prior to the popularity 
of the Internet as known today. In addition, a myriad of scholarly articles address 
societal expectations of privacy in the digital age, the increased use of the 
Internet by terrorist organizations, and of the lack of clarity in the existing legal 
paradigm relating to surveillance of the Internet by the law enforcement and 
intelligence communities. 
Throughout this country’s history, a constant cycle of technological 
developments have enabled the government to engage in more efficient means 
of conducting surveillance, while at the same time, challenging an individual’s 
privacy and civil liberties. Often, in response, legislative attempts have been 
made to rectify gaps in the protections of those civil liberties, as well as judicial 
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efforts to align societal expectations of an individual’s Constitutional rights with 
new and emerging technologies, especially when existing laws have failed to 
keep up with technological advancements. With the advent of social media and 
cloud computing, laws have once again failed to keep pace with the rapid 
advancements in technologies. Privacy and civil liberties are at a crossroad. As 
Microsoft Associate General Counsel Mike Hintze stated, “[m]any Americans 
take for granted the protections of the Bill of Rights that prevent the government 
from coming into people's homes without a valid search warrant. The rise of 
cloud computing should not diminish these privacy safeguards.”3 
B. EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF PRIVACY IN THE UNITED 
STATES AND THE APPLICATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO 
COMMUNICATIONS 
The framers of the Constitution enacted the Fourth Amendment to ensure 
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures in response to three pivotal 
cases, two occurring in England, and the third in the colonies. The two English 
cases, Wilkes v. Woods, 19 Howelll’s State Trials 1153 (1763), and Entick v. 
Carrington, 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029 (1765), stemmed from the actions of an 
individual who had distributed pamphlets critical of the King and his ministers. 
The King issued a “writ,” or general warrant to search the papers and other 
personal effects of the pamphleteer and his associates, to obtain evidence in 
support of a charge of seditious libel against the pamphleteer. The third case, 
known as the “Writ of Assistance” case, challenged the issuance of a general writ 
to permit the King’s customs inspectors to obtain evidence of smuggling in the 
American colonies. The governmental intrusion stemming from these three cases 
so angered the Colonists that it further inflamed their growing opposition to 
British rule.4 In response, the Founding Fathers sought to ensure that the powers 
of the newly created government were placed in check by providing an individual 
                                            
3 Hintze, “Restoring Balance to American Surveillance Laws.” 
4 See Net Industries, “Search and Seizure-The Fourth Amendment: Origins, Text, and 
History,” 2012, http://law.jrank.org/pages/2014/Search-Seizure-Fourth Amendment. 
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with freedom from unwarranted and unreasonable searches and seizures of 
home, person, papers, and effects. The Founding Fathers could not possibly 
have envisioned a world in which the details of an individual’s personal, 
professional, political and religious life that, in their day, had been communicated 
or maintained in writings stored within their homes or made face-to-face with their 
associates, would now be communicated and stored outside of the home in the 
electronic manner to which Americans have become accustomed. 
Initially, violations of the Fourth Amendment were redressed in trespass 
law. However, in 1890, two years after the introduction of the first widely 
available Kodak camera, two esteemed jurists Samuel Warrant and Louis 
Brandeis argued in a law review article entitled “Right to Privacy” 5  that an 
individual possesses a “right to be let alone” that may be redressed in tort law 
(the law of injury). Thirty years later, Justice Brandeis, now sitting on the 
Supreme Court, authored a pivotal dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. U.S.,6 which 
would become the framework for today’s constitutionally guaranteed privacy 
paradigm. In doing so, he argued that an individual possess a right to privacy in 
his telephonic communications, even if they travel outside of the physical walls of 
the home. Justice Brandeis envisioned a time when advancements in technology 
would enable the government to engage in extremely intrusive surveillance of 
citizens, and thus, argued for the recognition of an individual’s right to be 
protected from unwarranted governmental searches and seizures in new and 
emerging technologies. The Supreme Court would not recognize this right for 40 
more years. 
In 1964, with computers in the embryonic stage of development and with 
the Internet still a dream of a few Department of Defense researchers and 
academics, Edward Bloustein in a law review article entitled “Privacy as an 
                                            
5 Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel Warren, “The Right to Privacy,” Harv. L. Rev. 4, 193 (1890). 
6 Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
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Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser”7 strongly advocated for a 
review of statute and common law to facilitate the development of privacy law 
that would ensure that an individual’s privacy interests were protected in light of 
rapidly developing technologies. As Justice Brandeis had prognosticated, 
Bloustein called attention to the fact that:  
in our own day scientific and technological advances have raised 
the specter of new and frightening invasions of privacy. Our 
capacity as a society to deal with the impact of new technology 
depends, in part on the degree to which we can assimilate the 
threat it poses to the settled ways our legal institutions have 
developed for dealing with similar threats in the past.8 
A few years later in 1968, in Katz v. U.S.,9 the Supreme Court finally 
adopted the legal reasoning set forth in the legendary Justice Brandeis Olmstead 
dissent and held that an individual possesses a “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” in telephonic communications to include even those occurring outside of 
the home. Katz established a two-step test for determining whether an individual 
enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy. The test provides that an individual 
enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy: 1) if the person exhibited an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy; and 2) if that expectation is one that society is 
prepared to recognize as reasonable. Conversely, the court noted that the 
reasonable expectation of privacy is negated when an individual confides in 
another, which gives rise to what is known as the “Third Party Doctrine.” 
The Third Party Doctrine is a judicially formulated doctrine that negates 
the reasonable expectation of privacy when information is communicated to a 
third party. Courts have held that:  
when an individual reveals private information to another, he 
assumes the risk that his confidant will reveal that information to the 
authorities, and if that occurs the Fourth Amendment does not 
                                            
7 Edward J. Bloustein, “Privacy As an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean 
Prosser,” 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev 962 (1964). 
8 Ibid. 
9 Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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prohibit governmental use of that information. Once information is 
shared even with only one other, it is no longer “private”; the Fourth 
Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of the now non-
private information.10 
The Third Party Doctrine is particularly troubling today because most data 
residing in the digital world is transmitted or stored on third party intermediary 
sites. An individual may elect all possible privacy settings in an attempt to 
manifest a reasonable expectation of privacy. However, the application of the 
Third Party Doctrine to data transmitted and communicated in social media or 
stored in the cloud would arguably provide the government with such unfettered 
access that it would negate the protections envisioned by the Fourth Amendment. 
Many scholars argue that the Third Party Doctrine, taken to its logical 
conclusion, has the potential to deprive all electronic communications occurring 
in social media and stored in the cloud of any Fourth Amendment protection,11 
and therefore, the Third Party Doctrine must be modified.12 Prof. John Palfrey in 
“The Public and the Private at the United States Border with Cyberspace” has 
argued it is time to “rethink legal protections for citizens from state surveillance in 
a digital age as a result of this third-party data problem.”13 The concerns raised 
by both Brandeis and Bloustein regarding the need to adopt legal and procedural 
safeguards to ensure an individual’s privacy and civil liberties in the face of new 
and emerging technologies are just as relevant today as they were in their times. 
Scholars, legislators, policy makers and the public are currently engaged in a 
fierce debates over whether an individual who utilizes the services of a third party 
social media provider is entitled to Fourth Amendment protections against 
                                            
10 U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
11 Katherine J. Strandburg, “Home, Home on the Web, and Other Fourth Amendment 
Implications of Technosocial Change,” Maryland L. Rev. 70, no. 101 (2011), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1808071. 
12 See also Justice Sotomayor concurrence in U.S. v. Jones, 565 U.S. __, slip at 5-6 
(January 23, 2012). 
13 John Palfrey, “The Public and the Private at the United States Border with Cyberspace.” 
Miss. L. J. 78, no. 2 (2008): 241–292. 
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unwarranted searches and seizures, and if so, how best to create legal and 
policy safeguards to ensure an individual’s privacy and civil liberties. 
C. THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT OF 1986 
Katz v. U.S. held that individuals do possess a Fourth Amendment 
protected reasonable expectations of privacy in their telephonic communications 
regardless of where they may occur. However, a reasonable expectation of 
privacy is negated when communications are shared with another. With the 
growth in popularity and promise of computer network communications, including 
specifically electronic mail (e-mail), Congress saw the need to enact legislation 
that would embed Fourth Amendment like privacy safeguards into federal 
surveillance laws to protect the increased use of third party intermediaries 
(computer networks) entrusted with the transmission and storage of e-mail. 
Therefore, in 1986, Congress enacted ECPA.14 Enacted prior to the public 
use of the Internet, ECPA extended federal wiretap restrictions to new forms of 
electronic communications. ECPA protects electronic communications from being 
intercepted or disclosed to another absent a warrant or a specific exemption.15 
Title II of ECPA, known as the “the Stored Communication Act,” provides 
protections for electronic communications in temporary storage as part of the 
store-and-forward computer communications process.16 While Title I of ECPA, 
the Wiretap Act, covered the “forwarding” part of computer communications, Title 
II, the Stored Communications Act, covered the “stored” part, which is 
transitionally storage pending delivery or further transmission of the message (it 
is not storage of the content after it has been received). Thus, for example, the  
 
                                            
14 The ECPA amended Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act of 1968 
(The Wiretap Act). 
15 18 USC § 2511(1)(a) proscribes “intentionally intercept[ing] . . . any wire, oral, or electronic 
communication,” unless the intercept is authorized by a court order or by other exceptions. 
16 While not all electronic communications at the time followed the store and forward 
transmission protocol, the most dominant at the time, e-mail, did. Others, such as File Transfer 
Protocol, operated slightly differently. 
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Stored Communications Act covers e-mail transmitted to a recipient but not 
opened for a period of time not to exceed 180 days after which time it is 
considered abandoned.17 
As forward leaning as the statute was in at the time of its passage, it 
codified Congress' understanding of computer networks as they existed at the 
time and failed to consider advancements in technology.18 The dizzying array of 
access standards adopted by Congress reflected Congress’ understanding of 
computer networks as they existed in 1986. Today, policy makers, legislators, 
judges, law enforcement and intelligence communities, and the general public 
are left with an antiquated statute that fails to provide clear standards for the 
application of the Fourth Amendment. These safeguards are ill suited for today’s 
Web 2.0 social networking and cloud computing technologies. Accordingly, the 
Fifth Circuit described attempts to interpret ECPA as a “search for lightning bolts 
of comprehension [that] traverses a fog of inclusions and exclusions which 
obscures both the parties’ burdens and ultimate goal.”19 
The USA Patriot Act amended portions of ECPA that greatly facilitated the 
government’s ability to obtain access to telephone, e-mail communications, 
medical, financial, and other records. At the same time, it eased restrictions on 
the government’s ability to engage in foreign intelligence gathering within the 
United States, and expanded the use of National Security Letters that enabled 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to search telephone, e-mail, and 
financial records without a court order. 20  Further, it permitted the delay in 
notification to the subject of the search, and in some cases, provided no notice at 
all. 
                                            
17 18 U.S.C § 2510(17)(A). 
18 Orin S. Kerr, “A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator's Guide 
to Amending It.” Geo Wash L. Rev. 72 (2004): 1208. Neither ECPA's statutory language nor its 
legislative history makes any reference to the Internet. Yonatan Lupu, “The Wiretap Act and Web 
Monitoring: A Breakthrough for Privacy Rights?” VA. J. L. & Tech. 9, no. 3 (2004). 
19 Briggs v. Am. Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414, 415 (5th Cir. 1980). 
20 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001. 
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ECPA “is famous (if not infamous) for its lack of clarity,”21 in large part 
because of the differing standards that both private entities and the government 
must meet to obtain access to electronic records. Courts have had difficulty 
applying consistent readings within each title of the Act. Recently, the Sixth 
Circuit Federal Court of Appeals in Warshak v. U.S. went so far as to discard the 
Stored Communications Act as being unconstitutional. The Court concluded that 
to the “extent the [Stored Communications Act] purports to permit the 
government to obtain such e-mails without a warrant, the [Stored 
Communications Act] is unconstitutional.”22 
Courts are just now beginning to be confronted with cases in which they 
are being asked to determine whether or not an individual enjoys a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in digital communications occurring in social media or 
stored in the cloud. A district court in California encountered this issue for the first 
time in 2010 in a case between two private litigants. The Court held that private 
messages sent using Facebook or MySpace do in fact fall under the protections 
of the Stored Communications Act that limits the government’s ability to force the 
internet service provider to “disclose information in their possession about their 
customers and subscribers.” 23 Similarly, items posted on an individual’s “wall” 
may also enjoy the protections of the Stored Communications Act, but only to the 
extent that an individual invoked the site’s available privacy protections. It is 
extremely likely that in the coming days, courts will be confronted with additional 
                                            
21 Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 1994). The 
5th Circuit held that “the seizure of a computer, used to operate an electronic bulletin board 
system, and containing private electronic mail which had been sent to (stored on) the bulletin 
board, but not read () by the intended recipients, did not constitutes an unlawful intercept under 
the Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq., as amended by Title I of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, Public Law 99-508, U.S. Statutes at Large 100 (1986)”; See also 
U.S. v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that the 5th Circuit “might have put the 
matter too mildly”); Orin S. Kerr, “Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big 
Brother That Isn’t.” NW. U. L. Rev. 97, no. 2 (2003): 607. “The law of electronic surveillance is 
famously complex, if not entirely impenetrable.” 
22 U.S. v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010). Although the Warshak holding may be 
persuasive in the other 11 federal circuit courts, it is not binding outside of the 6th Circuit. 
23 Crispin v. Audigier, Inc., “Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Review of Magistrate 
Judge’s Decision Re Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash Subpoena,” United States District Court, Central 
District of California, filed May 26, 2010, CV 09-09509-MMM-JEM. 
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cases in which they will be called upon to strike a balance between an 
individual’s Constitutional right to be protected from unwarranted searches and 
seizures, and the government’s law enforcement and intelligence gathering 
needs. 
D. DEVELOPMENT OF WEB 2.0 TECHNOLOGIES 
Computer network communications have continued to technologically 
evolve from Web 1.0 technology, in which anyone could publish a webpage and 
communicate with everyone, to Web 2.0 technology in which anyone can publish 
a webpage and everyone can interact with, comment on, and share content on 
that web page, and currently to Web 3.0 technology, in which everyone can 
contribute, create, collaborate, and curate the content. Cloud computing has 
transformed information technology by moving both content and applications 
from the desktop computer secured within an individual’s private home or 
business, to third party server farms located in undisclosed destinations. A new 
generation, referred to as Digital Natives, has grown up online that always has 
access to information technology.24 Their social space has transformed from one 
restrained by distance and the need to be physically together to socialize, to an 
always on, always interactive, always with you social media experience. 
Facebook, the most popular social media site, reportedly has exceeded 845 
million users worldwide.25 Social media provides the opportunity to post and 
share information with everyone anywhere in the world, or, with the appropriate 
settings, only to a restricted select few. 
E. PRIVACY AND SOCIAL MEDIA 
Is an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy diminishing as more 
personal information is posted online, more confidences bared on social media, 
                                            




25 Facebook, “Statistics,” (n.d.), http://www.facebook.com/ press/info.php?statistics. 
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and more information uploaded to third party services? Is there any merit to the 
notion attributed to Sun Microsystems CEO Scott McNealy that in cyberspace, an 
individual has “zero privacy anyway” and they should “just get over it.”26 Privacy 
has always been a difficult concept to define. Alan Westin in 1967 noted, “few 
values so fundamental to society as privacy have been left so undefined in social 
theory or have been the subject of such vague and confused writing by social 
scientist.”27  Professor Daniel Solove, who has written extensively on privacy 
issues declared, “the concept of privacy is in disarray. Privacy seems to be about 
everything and therefore it appears to be about nothing.” However defined, 
privacy is a cherished value that is critical to a free society. As more and more 
individuals mediate their lives in social media, defining the notion of privacy has 
become even more difficult. 
Despite the collaborative notion of social media, researchers have 
debunked the proverbial wisdom that users of social media have no expectation 
of privacy. A growing body of research suggests that individuals still retain some 
expectations of privacy, and especially, young people who have been dubbed 
“Digital Natives.” danah boyd,28 who has performed extensive research on the 
practices and attitudes of teens online, asserts that young people very much 
possess an expectation of privacy in their online postings that is manifested by 
the way in which they “manage” their online associations by limiting who may 
have access to their postings, as well as the use of codes to mask the meaning 
of their communications.29 
                                            
26 Polly Sprenger, “Sun on Privacy: ‘Get Over It’,” Wired, January 26, 1999, 
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/1999/01/17538. 
27 Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York: Atheneum, 1967), 7. 
28 danah boyd does not capitalize the first letter of her name. See danah boyd, (n.d.), 
“What’s in a Name?” http://www.danah.org/name.html. 
29 danah boyd and Alice E. Marwick, “Social Privacy in Networked Publics: Teens’ Attitudes, 
Practices, and Strategies: A Decade in Internet Time,” Symposium on the Dynamics of the 
Internet and Society, September 2011, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1925128. 
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F. WEB 2.0 TECHNOLOGIES: AN ENGINE FOR CHANGE, GOOD AND 
BAD 
The Internet promotes American ideals of participatory government, the 
corner stone to a sound democracy.30 It has facilitated the spread of democratic 
ideals both within this country and around the world. At the same time, it can 
enhance national security by providing situational awareness about country 
conditions so that the United States is not blindsided when political upheavals 
occur. The recent events in the Middle East known as the “Arab Spring” were 
aided in part by the availability of social media technologies. Individuals in 
repressive regimes utilized social media to communicate with like-minded people 
in ways previously only possible at great peril to their well-being. It also enabled 
dissidents to focus international attention on these repressive regimes by 
transmitting news of atrocities committed by government forces. 
At the same time, social networking sites are increasingly being utilized by 
terrorist entities for recruiting purposes, planning and financing, and execution of 
terrorist acts,31 as well as by individuals engaged in other criminal ventures, such 
as the recent attacks on government websites by “hacktivists” like LulzSec and 
Anonymous? In “Terrorist Financing and the Internet,” Michael Jacobson noted 
that terrorist organizations, such Al Qaeda, are increasingly relying on the 
Internet “to spread its toxic message and drum up support throughout the world.” 
In addition, Al Qaeda has utilized the Internet to recruit, plan and execute terrorist 
activities and for fundraising. 32  In an attempt to identify and track terrorist 
activities on the web, the University of Arizona’s Artificial Intelligence lab 
instituted the “Dark Web” project. As of 2007, the project estimated that between 
7,000 and 8,000 web sites were “created and maintained by known international 
terrorist groups, including Al-Qaeda, the Iraqi insurgencies, and many 
                                            
30 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F.Supp. 825 (ED.Pa. 1996), aff'd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
31 EUROPOL 2010. 
32 Michael Jacobson, “Terrorist Financing and the Internet,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 
33, no. 4 (2010): 353–63. 
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homegrown terrorist cells in Europe.” 33  Given the ubiquitous nature of the 
Internet, it has become a valuable source of intelligence for the law enforcement 
and intelligence community by enabling the collection of information in ways not 
previously possible. 
However, some argue that the tracking of terrorist activity may result in 
degradation in civil rights. In “Terror on the Internet,”34 Michael Weimann argues 
that although terrorist organizations take advantage of the largely “unregulated, 
anonymous and accessible nature of the Internet,” surveillance of the Internet by 
the law enforcement and intelligence communities may result in an infringement 
of an individual’s privacy. Mark Rotenberg, Executive Director of the Electronic 
Privacy Information Center, an online civil-liberties group, also cautioned that the 
tools utilized by projects like the Dark Web “to track terrorists can also be used to 
track political opponents,”35 in contravention of the First Amendment. 
Growing concern exists about the ease by which the government can 
aggregate the vast amounts of an individual’s pertinent information pertaining to 
an individual that is now available electronically in social networking technologies 
or stored in the cloud, and create what is being called “digital dossiers.” This 
concern is particularly great among “Digital Natives,” defined by Palfrey and 
Gasser as young people, born after 1980, who have lived their lives on line 
“mediated by digital technologies.” 36  Digital natives, as well as the general 
population, are finding it increasingly more difficult to protect their privacy as 
information pertaining to them is increasingly being compiled into digital dossiers. 
To date, no consensus exists as to the level of process necessary for the 
 
                                            
33 University of Arizona, Dark Web Project, “Scientists Use the “Dark Web” to Snag 
Extremists and Terrorists Online,” Press Release 07-118. 
34 Gabriel Weimann, “Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenge,” The 
United States Institute of Peace, 2006. 
35 Steven Kotler, “'Dark Web' Project Takes on Cyber-Terrorism,” October 12, 2010, 
http://www.stevenkotler.com/node/87. 
36 John Palfrey and Urs Gasser, Born Digital (New York: Basic Books, 2008), 53. 
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government to obtain information stored in these third-party digital dossiers that 
will ensure Fourth Amendment like protections to individuals’ digital selves in 
cyberspace. 
G. GROWING FRUSTRATION AND EFFORTS TO REFORM ECPA 
Many believe that EPCA fails to provide sufficient clarity to govern today’s 
transformed social media environment and are calling for a statutory revision.37 
In 2010, Congress held hearings in which it explored the possibility of reforming 
ECPA.38 Testimony not only focused on the need to fix the legendary “lack of 
clarity” provided by ECPA but also on the need to bring the law into alignment 
with the development in technology and societal expectations of privacy. At the 
September 22, 2010, Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, Committee Chairman 
Patrick Leahy stated that: 
[b]ringing this privacy law into the Digital Age will be one of 
Congress's greatest challenges . . . the 'ECPA is a law that is often 
hampered by conflicting privacy standards that create uncertainty 
and confusion for law enforcement, the business community and 
American consumers.39  
On May 19, 2011, Senator Leahy introduced the ECPA Amendments Act of 2011, 
S. 1011. 
Similarly, scholars also have been grappling with determining how to 
achieve a reasonable expectation of privacy within personal e-mail accounts. 
                                            
37 The Digital Due Process Coalition, whose members include major giants in the technology 
and commerce sectors, such as Amazon, AOL, Microsoft, Center for Democracy and Technology, 
AT&T and Google, are seeking the amendment of ECPA so as “To simplify, clarify, and unify the 
ECPA standards, providing stronger privacy protections for communications and associated data 
in response to changes in technology and new services and usage patterns, while preserving the 
legal tools necessary for government agencies to enforce the laws, respond to emergency 
circumstances and protect the public.” Digital Due Process Coalition, 
http://www.digitaldueprocess.org. 
38 ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Cloud Computing. Hearing of the House Committee 
on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, September 23, 
2010, http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear_100923.html. 
39 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Promoting Security and Protecting Privacy in 
the Digital Age. Hearing of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Statement of Senator Patrick 
Leahy (D-Vt.), Chairman, Senate Committee on the Judiciary), September 22, 2010, 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=4776&wit_id=2629. 
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Professor Orin Kerr in “Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A 
General Approach” offers a possible approach to affording Fourth Amendment, 
protections to communications transmitted in e-mail.40 He asserts that the Fourth 
Amendment should be applied in the digital world in the same manner in which it 
is applied in the physical world. In the physical world, the Fourth Amendment 
affords protections to the inside of an individual’s home but provides little to no 
protections outside the walls of said home. As such, he suggests that in the 
digital world, Fourth Amendment protections should be afforded to the inside of a 
person’s electronic communications, i.e., the contents, but not to the outside, i.e., 
the address and subject lines.41 
The level of privacy protections that should be afforded to social media 
interactions, in which varying levels of privacy settings are invoked, is not well 
settled. In the absence of Congressional action to amend ECPA to keep it in line 
with the realities of today’s technological advancements, courts will have no 
choice but to attempt to provide some judicial interpretation and forge ahead that 
may result in inconsistent outcomes as cases work their way up to the Supreme 
Court. In addition, in the absence of legislative relief, executive agencies are also 
beginning to develop administrative guidelines for the collection of information 
obtained from social media. 
Moreover, the lack of clear legislative standards has placed third party 
service providers squarely in the middle of this debate. It has become commonly 
accepted practice for social networking service providers to supply notice to its 
users if presented with “lawful requests” that they will provide content to law 
enforcement or intelligence entities. In the absence of clearer legislative and 
judicial standards, the determination of whether a request made pursuant to 
                                            
40 See Orin S. Kerr, “Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, George Washington Law 
School Pub. L. Research Paper No. 13, Harvard L. Rev. 119 (2005): 531; Kerr, “A User's Guide 
to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator's Guide to Amending It”; Kerr, “Internet 
Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act”; Orin S. Kerr, “Lifting the “Fog” of Internet 
Surveillance: How a Suppression Remedy Would Change Computer Crime Law,” Hastings L. J. 
54 (2003): 805.  
41 Kerr, “Lifting the “Fog” of Internet Surveillance.” 
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other than a judicially issued warrant, is in fact, lawful is currently left to the 
companies and their legal counsel to determine, which has placed service 
providers at risk for legal action by the government, as well as by individuals.42 
With the advent of social media and cloud computing, and society’s rapid 
adoption thereof, once again society finds itself in a place in time in which laws 
affording the individual protections against unreasonable governmental searches 
and seizures are out of alignment with the realities of modern life. The need for 
additional scholarly work in these areas will likely grow as academics, the courts, 
service providers, legislators and the public continue to struggle to determine 
how the Fourth Amendment should be applied to communications occurring in e-
mail and in social media. 
                                            
42 An example occurred in 2005, when the Department of Justice (DOJ) sought to obtain one 
week of searches from Google to help the DOJ defend its position on the Child Online Protection 
Act. Google held the position that the request was improper, overly broad, and refused to honor 
the request in the absence of a warrant as required by the Stored Communication Act of ECPA. 
Google was then forced to defend its position in court. This case and other subsequent cases 
highlight the ever increasing need to strike the correct balance between Fourth Amendment 
expectations of privacy with the law enforcement and intelligence communities’ need to obtain 
pertinent information to detect, prevent and thwart potential terrorist and other criminal acts. 
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III. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY 
JURISPRUDENCE  
The concept of privacy as a cherished value and civil right in the United 
States has its roots in Colonial America and has continued to develop throughout 
this country’s history. Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has evolved as 
communications networks have moved from the Pony Express to the Twitter Bird. 
Concern for the security and privacy of communications networks was born out 
of the colonists’ rebellion against a King who executed arbitrarily searches and 
seizure of his subject’s home and personal effects. Many years after the birth of 
this nation, it was revisited when the Supreme Court was confronted with the 
novelty of the telephone. Four decades later, when the telephone had become 
more of an annoyance than a novelty, and the early Internet was beginning to be 
built, the Supreme Court recognized that people possessed a “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” and that expectation extended to the person and not just 
property. Two additional decades passed and the Internet was becoming the 
Department of Defense’s primary data network (although few outside the 
Department of Defense-academic community had been given access). Congress, 
anticipating the importance this new communications medium would play in 
modern society, extended privacy protections from analog phone lines to digital 
communications. Another two and a half decades have passed, during which 
time the Internet has become a fundamental mean’s of communication. The 
Constitutional concern for the privacy of communications, and the access of the 
sovereign to those communications, has evolved over hundreds of years. It has 
occurred during a time in which the speed of communications networks have 
been measured in bits per week (pony express), bits per day (telegraph), bits per 
minute (telephone), and now gigabits per second (broadband Internet). 
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A. EARLY AMERICAN CONCEPTS OF PRIVACY—”A MAN’S HOME IS 
HIS CASTLE” 
David Flaherty, in Privacy in Colonial New England, writes that colonists 
living in New England viewed their homes as “a heaven for solitude and intimacy 
as a barrier against intrusion by uninvited outsiders.”43 Legal justification for this 
view stemmed from the 1604 English Semayne case 44  that gave legal 
recognition to the age-old adage that “[a] man’s home is his castle.” The case 
challenged the Crown’s ability to break into a subject’s home unannounced, and 
gave rise to the requirement that prior to entering a subject’s home to execute 
legal process, the Crown’s representative was required to announce his 
impending entry and the justification for doing so, which established the 
importance of providing notice to the subject of governmental action.  
In the period leading up to the Revolution, the age-old tenet came under 
attack both in England and in the colonies when the Crown, facing political 
pressure, increased its use of the “Writ of Assistance.” Writs of Assistance 
granted representatives of the Crown virtually unlimited authority to enter an 
individual’s home, and search and seize items found therein. Evidence obtained 
in these general searches was used to squash political discontent and to combat 
the burgeoning smuggling trade in the colonies. The General Writ was 
particularly arbitrary and enabled the holder to enter a private home or business 
without specific justification. General Warrants could be executed without 
warning and with little oversight to keep governmental abuses in check. As such, 
they greatly tested the bounds of the principle that an individual’s home was 
indeed his castle. The use of the writ was challenged in three seminal cases: 
Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (1765) (England); Wilkes v. 
Wood, 19 Howell's State Trials 1153 (1763) (England); and the Writ of  
 
                                            
43 David H. Flaherty, Privacy in Colonial New England (University of Virginia Press, 1967), 85. 
44 Semayne’s Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K. B. 1603), 1604, 
http://www.law cornell.edu/ancon/html/amd4frag1_user.html. 
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Assistance Case (1761) (The Colonies). The outcome of these cases added fuel 
to growing colonial discontent with English rule, and ultimately, resulted in the 
passage of the Fourth Amendment.  
Entick and Wilkes arose from the execution of a Writ of Assistance used to 
break into the homes of John Wilkes and his associates. Wilkes was a 
pamphleteer accused of seditious libel for printing materials adverse to the King 
and his practices. Agents of the King ransacked the homes of Mr. Wilkes and his 
associates and seized private books and papers. Lord Camden, the judge 
presiding over these defining cases, declared that the use of the writs to allow 
the removal of an individual’s papers and other personal affects undermined the 
fundamental liberties of Englishmen. Personal papers, Lord Camden noted, are 
an individual’s “dearest property” and “where private papers are removed and 
carried away, the secret nature of those goods will be an aggravation of the 
trespass.”45 The issuance of a general warrant not premised upon what has 
become known as probable cause, had no basis in English common law. More 
than 100 years later, the U.S. Supreme Court would comment on the significance 
of Lord Camden’s ruling in the case of Boyd v. U.S.:  
The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of 
constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther than the 
concrete form of the case then before the court, with its 
adventitious circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the part 
of the government and its employee’s of the sanctity of a man's 
home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, 
and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of 
the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of 
personal security, personal liberty and private property, where that 
right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public 
offence,—it is the invasion of this sacred right which underlies and 
constitutes the essence of Lord Camden's judgment.46 
The Wilkes and Entick cases were quite influential in the colonies in which 
tensions were mounting over attacks on the individual liberties of the colonists. 
                                            
45 Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1030, 1066 (1765). 
46 Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). 
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These tensions came to a feverish pitch when the Crown used a General Writ to 
enter the business of a Boston merchant accused of smuggling. Smuggling in the 
colonies was rampant at the time in large part as a way to avoid usurious 
taxation rates imposed by the Crown. James Otis, the former British Advocate 
General in the colonies, unsuccessfully challenged the Writ on behalf of the 
Boston merchant. Otis declared the actions of the Crown to be the “worst 
instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty and the 
fundamental principles of law that ever was found in an English law-book.”47 Otis’ 
five-hour speech was witnessed by the impressionable young John Adams, who 
declared that “then and there, the child Independence was born.”48 
B. DRAFTING OF A NEW CONSTITUTION—A GOVERNMENT THAT 
SERVED AT THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 
As the revolutionary struggle played out, freedom from governmental 
intrusion as a precursor to the concept of privacy was deemed to be an essential 
element to a free society. This sentiment was enshrined in the Declaration of 
Independence that pronounced that all men are endowed with certain inalienable 
rights, and that “among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.” The 
Founding Fathers sought to create a government that served at the will of the 
people and whose powers were limited to those bestowed upon it by the people. 
This aspiration is encapsulated in the United States Constitution which sets forth 
the structure of the three parts of the government, as well as the relationship of 
the citizen to the state.  
The concept that the government served at the will of the people and not 
the other way around was the product of liberal thinkers of the Enlightenment 
period. Thomas Jefferson, one of the central drafters of the Declaration of 
Independence and of the Constitution, had been greatly influenced by the works 
                                            
47 James Otis, “Against Writs of Assistance,” National Humanities Institute, February 1761, 
http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/writs.htm. 
48 The Boston Society, “History of the Old State House Building,” 2012. 
http://www.bostonhistory.org/?s=osh&p=history. 
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of the English Enlightenment philosopher John Locke and incorporated his 
principles into the documents that serve as the cornerstone to the American 
democracy. Locke, the father of liberalism writing in 1600s, had refuted the 
concept of the Divine Rights of Kings49 in the Two Treatises of Government.50 
The principles contained within the Divine Rights of Kings had kept the European 
monarchy in power for generations. Locke argued that in a civil society, freemen 
who had been bestowed by god with natural rights, such as self-liberty, willingly 
relinquished to the government those liberties for the sake of the guarantee of 
safe peaceful enjoyment of person and property. 51  Government formed by 
“mutual agreement of men acting freely” served the interests of its citizens and 
when it ceased to do so, could be disbanded and a new government created in 
its stead that would do so. Locke also argued that the powers of a government 
should be divided among different branches of government to include a strong 
legislative branch, whose laws were to be reviewed by “authorized judges” and 
an executive that could not usurp the authority of the other branches of 
government.52 It was in this spirit that the Founding Fathers sought to ensure that 
the powers of the newly created government were placed in check, for as 
Constitutional scholar Benno C. Schmidt Jr. reminds us, “privacy is absolutely 
essential to maintaining a free society. The idea that is at the foundation of the 
notion of privacy is that the citizen is not the tool or the instrument of government 
—but the reverse.''53 
Patriot George Mason set forth the basic requirements for lawful search 
and seizure in the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which was adopted shortly 
                                            
49 Robert Flemming, Political Discourses, Viz. Patriachal, or the Natural Power of Kings: The 
Free-Holders Grand-Inquest (Google Books, 1680). 
50 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Google Books, 1821). 
51 Peter Laslett, John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (New York: Mentor Books, 1963), 
377–82. 
52 Locke, Two Treatises of Government, book II, ch. 11–12. 
53 Curtis Sitimore, “To Benno Schmidt Jr., There Can Be No Free Society Without Privacy,” 
Christian Science Monitor, December 5, 1986, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/1986/1205/zfree3b.html#.ThRqspPmwIs.e-mail. 
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before the enactment of the Declaration of Independence, which ultimately 
provided the foundation for the Fourth Amendment that protects “persons, papers 
and effects” from such arbitrary invasion by requiring law enforcement to obtain 
warrants issued by a court upon a showing of probable cause. The Fourth 
Amendment’s protections provide important safeguards against possible tyranny 
of government. 54  The Fourth Amendment, which provides limits on the 
government’s ability to search and seize an individual’s home and effects without 
a judicially issued warrant premised on probable cause, provides as follows: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized.  
As forward thinking as the Founding Fathers were in crafting a system of 
government that would protect the civil rights of its citizens, they could not have 
possibly anticipated advancements in technology that exist in today’s networked 
world. David Flaherty in Privacy in Colonial New England opined that “[p]rivacy 
received as much protection in the Bill of Rights as was needed at the time; the 
various amendments have remained the starting point as the American legal 
system has sought to respond to the vastly increased number of serious 
challenges to personal privacy in modern American society.”55 
C. COMMON LAW PROHIBITION AGAINST “EAVESDROPPING” 
Arguably, one of the first forms of surveillance recognizable in common 
law was the act of “eavesdropping.” Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Law of 
England described the offense as “[to] listen under walls or window or the eaves 
of a house, to hearken after discourse, and thereupon to frame slanderous and 
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mischievous tales.” It was an offense punishable by “fine and finding of sureties 
for good behavior.”56 Eavesdropping was a crime recognizable in early America, 
although perpetrators were rarely prosecuted. As such, the legal concept had 
“nearly faded from the legal horizon”57 by the 19th century. However, with the 
advent of modern day means of communications, the principle embedded in this 
common law prohibition was codified in subsequently passed wiretap legislation. 
D. FREEDOM FROM PRYING EYES, PRIVACY IN EARLY MAIL  
During the colonial period, the mail system was the central means for 
communicating between England and the colonies and within the colonies. 
Benjamin Franklin was tasked by England in 1753 to run the mail system in the 
colonies. 58  Users of the mail system had very little expectation that their 
correspondence would arrive unopened. 59  In 1753, Franklin required mail 
carriers to take an oath not to open mail entrusted to them. Despite the 
administration of this oath, Robert Ellis Smith, in Ben Franklin’s Web Site: 
Privacy and Curiosity from Plymouth Rock to the Internet, asserts that “opening 
of the mail by authorities was neither unusual nor unexpected,”60  especially 
during the Revolution. By 1775, Franklin had been dismissed as Postmaster by 
England “for sympathies to the cause of the colonies.” William Goddard, the new 
colonial postmaster, warned patrons of the service: 
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Letters are liable to be stopped & opened by ministerial mandates, 
& their contents construed into treasonable conspiracies; and 
newspapers, those necessary and important vehicles, especially in 
times of public danger, may be rendered of little avail for want of 
Circulation. . . .61 
During the Revolutionary War, grave consequences occurred if the 
contents of patriot’s written correspondence fell into the hands of representatives 
of the King. Individuals took great steps to protect their correspondence to 
include writing under a pen name (pseudonym) or using codes or ciphers, two 
early forms of encryption.62 
Shortly after the birth of the United States, Congress passed the first of 
several laws prohibiting the opening of mail put into the custody of the newly 
formed U.S. mail service.63 Congress passed an additional statue in 1825, which 
required letters and packages placed in the U.S. mail system to be free from 
“examination and inspection.” The constitutionality of the statute was affirmed by 
the Supreme Court in the case of ex parte v. Jackson, which held that: 
the right of the people to be secure in their papers against 
unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus 
closed against inspection, wherever they may be. Whilst in the mail, 
they can only be opened and examined under like warrant, issued 
upon similar oath or affirmation, particularly describing the thing to 
be seized, as is required when papers are subjected to search in 
one's own household.64 
E. ADVANCEMENTS IN TECHNOLOGY AND “THE RIGHT TO BE LEFT 
ALONE” 
With the introduction of a portable camera by Kodak in 1888 and other 
new technologies, the emphasis on privacy in America in the late 1800s shifted 
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from freedom from governmental intrusion of an individual’s home and physical 
being, to an individual’s concern about the publication of pertinent personal 
information that also concerns reputation, work product or the memorialization of 
thoughts. In a definitive 1890 Harvard Law Review article entitled Right to 
Privacy, two Harvard schooled attorneys, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, 
questioned the fundamental legal values adversely impacted by the advent of 
emerging technology. They challenged the courts to use the instrument of 
common law to craft remedies that would afford legal protections to ensure an 
individual’s privacy. Warren and Brandeis mused:  
the intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing 
civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, 
and man, under the refining influence of culture, has become more 
sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become 
more essential to the individual; but modern enterprise and 
invention have, through invasions upon his privacy, subjected him 
to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by 
mere bodily injury.65 
Brandeis and Warren argued that the ever-evolving instrument of common 
law needed to respond to “recent inventions and business practices” that enabled 
the intrusion of an individual’s “thoughts, emotions and sensations,” and bestow 
upon the individual legal recognition of “the right to be left alone.”66 “The Right to 
Privacy” was a stinging indictment of the newly emerging practices of journalists, 
in particular photojournalists, who were “invading the sacred precincts of private 
and domestic life and [whose] numerous mechanical devices threaten to make 
good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from 
the house-tops.”67 
The two partners noted that initially, the law provided protections from 
physical intrusions of an individual’s person and belongings and that liberty 
meant freedom from “physical restraint.” As time went by, recognition of a 
                                            




person’s “spiritual nature” and of “feelings and intellect” emerged. Accordingly, 
the “right to enjoy life,—the right to be let alone; the right to liberty secures the 
exercise of extensive civil privileges; and the term “property” have grown to 
comprise every form of possession—intangible, as well as tangible.”68 
Warren and Brandeis’ work is generally regarded as being the impetus 
behind the creation of the four invasion of privacy torts set forth in the 
Restatement (Second) of Tort: 69  (1) intrusion upon the seclusion; 70  (2) 
appropriation of name or likeness;71 (3) publicity given to private life;72 and (4) 
publicity placing person in false light.73 Courts began to apply the principles set 
forth in Warren and Brandeis’ “The Right to Privacy” in cases asserting injuries in 
tort and defamation.74 Gradually, the four torts were recognized by the courts 
and became part of American jurisprudence. Although they created private 
causes of actions and not rights against the government, they were instrumental 
in shaping the concept of privacy in America. 
F. PASSAGE OF THE FIRST WIRETAPPING STATUTE 
The first wiretapping statute was passed as a temporary measure to 
prevent disclosure of government secrets during World War I.75 However, with 
the invention and adaption of telegraph and telephones, states began enacting 
legislation to protect their citizens from unwarranted interception of their 
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telegraphic and telephonic communications. By 1928, 41 of the 48 states had 
“banned wiretapping or forbidden telegraph employees and officers from 
disclosing the content of telephone or telegraph or both.”76 
G. EARLY APPLICATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO 
TELEPHONIC COMMUNICATIONS—OLMSTEAD V. U.S. 
Judicial analysis of Fourth Amendment protections in a communications 
network dates back to 1928, long before the World Wide Web or social media. In 
1928, telephone service was still in its infancy. The Federal Communication 
Commission had yet to be established. Telephone service had not been 
universally deployed and was largely a tool for business. When initially 
confronted with a challenge to the propriety of wiretapping of private 
conversations occurring on this novel service, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 split 
decision, concluded that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to telephonic 
transmissions once they existed an individual’s home. In Olmstead, police 
officers had tapped defendant Ray Olmstead's phones and intercepted a 
transmission that exited his home and his office. In doing so, the police had not 
trespassed on the defendant's property at home or in the office, but attached 
equipment to the network nearby.77 The Supreme Court’s ruling that there was 
no expectation of privacy in a phone call remained the law of the land for four 
decades. 
Traditionally, searches were deemed to have occurred only when the 
government engaged in a physical trespass of an individual’s property. In this 
first Supreme Court decision addressing wiretapping by federal law enforcement 
officials of a bootlegger’s home and office, the court did not deviate from the 
physical trespass view and declared that an individual had no Fourth Amendment 
protected right of privacy in communications that exited the home by telephone. 
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The Court based its holding on the fact that “there was no searching. There was 
no seizure. The evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and 
that only.”78 
In a defining dissent, Louis Brandeis, co-author of The Right to Privacy 
and now a Supreme Court Justice, challenged the majority approach by 
declaring:  
in the application of a constitution, our contemplation cannot be 
only of what has been, but of what may be. The progress of science 
in furnishing the government with means of espionage is not likely 
to stop with wiretapping. Ways may someday be developed by 
which the government, without removing papers from secret 
drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be 
enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the 
home. Advances in the psychic and related sciences may bring 
means of exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions.79 
Brandeis argued that the Court in Olmstead failed to recognize the Constitution 
as a living document. The framers of the Constitution could not have anticipated 
the advancements that had occurred in technology since the colonial era nor did 
they intend for the protections afforded by the Bill of Rights to be limited to those 
threats that existed in the early days of this nation. Brandeis envisioned a time 
when surveillance apparatuses the size of a pin could be planted within one’s 
home by the government, with the effect to chill civilized man’s greatest 
possession, the right to have his own independent thought free from the 
judgmental eyes of the government. 
Brandeis explored the essence of the liberty interests the Founding 
Fathers were attempting to bestow:  
When the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were adopted, ‘the form 
that evil had theretofore taken,’ had been necessarily simple. Force 
and violence were then the only means known to man by which a 
Government could directly effect self-incrimination. It could compel 
the individual to testify—a compulsion effected, if need be, by 
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torture. It could secure possession of his papers and other articles 
incident to his private life—a seizure effected, if need be, by 
breaking and entry. Protection against such invasion of “the 
sanctities of a man's home and the privacies of life” was provided in 
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments by specific language. But “time 
works changes, brings into existence new conditions and 
purposes.” Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading 
privacy have become available to the Government. Discovery and 
invention have made it possible for the Government, by means far 
more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in 
court of what is whispered in the closet.80 
Brandeis’ dissent laid the foundation for what has become modern day privacy 
law. 
In 1934, six years after Olmstead, Congress attempted to rectify the 
adverse holding in Olmstead in the Federal Communications Act of 1934 by 
statutorily creating Fourth Amendment like protections for an individual’s 
telephonic communications. In addition to drafting a comprehensive regulatory 
scheme to address emerging telecommunications technologies, it also included a 
prohibition on wiretapping by any person including the government, thus bringing 
the law into alignment with advancements in technology. Section 605 of the Act 
provided that “no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any 
communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, 
purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person...”81 
H. JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF 
PRIVACY  
Olmstead remained the law of the land until 1967, when the 
constitutionality of wiretaps was once again challenged in two defining cases. In 
Berger v. U.S., the Fourth Amendment's protections were held to extend to a 
“conversation,” and the use of electronic devices to capture it was a “search” 
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within the meaning of that Amendment. 82  In Katz v. United States, 83  the 
Supreme Court determined that Fourth Amendment protections extend to the 
person and not just home and property. In these two cases, the Supreme Court 
adopted the arguments asserted by Brandeis in the Olmstead dissent, and 
brought the common law into alignment with prevailing societal expectations by 
holding that the Fourth Amendment protects people, and not merely places.84 
Thus, the court recognized that an individual does enjoy a Fourth Amendment 
protected expectation of privacy in telephonic communications occurring outside 
of the home.  
The Court in Katz established a two prong test to determine whether an 
individual possesses a “reasonable” or “legitimate” expectation of privacy.85 The 
test provides that an individual enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy if 
conduct reflects “an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,” that is, “one that 
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.’”86 Accordingly, when a person 
enters a public telephone booth, shuts the door and makes a call, this conduct 
reflects a reasonable expectation of privacy, and as such, the government must 
obtain a warrant to seize an individual’s conversations occurring in a 
communications network. However, the Supreme Court caveated its finding by 
noting that “what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own 
home or office is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection,”87 which gave 
rise to what has become known as the “Third Party Doctrine.” 
Many legal procedures exist to search and seize items by law 
enforcement and intelligence communities. They include warrants, court orders 
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and subpoenas. Each method requires differing levels of judicial oversight, with 
warrants requiring the maximum level and subpoenas requiring little to none. 
• Warrants—There are many types of warrants but as a general 
manner, a warrant is a judge's written order authorizing a law-
enforcement officer to conduct a search of a specified place and to 
seize evidence. The government must demonstrate that it has 
probable cause to believe that the evidence of a certain crime will 
be located at the place to be searched. A warrant premised upon 
probable cause is per se constitutional.  
• Court Orders—A court order is a command, direction, or instruction. 
A court order is a court’s mandate to compel an action. It can be to 
compel testimony, compel the disclosure of an items or to compel 
that action be taken. It can be issued in writing or orally and may or 
may not require the signature of a judge.  
• Subpoena—Latin for punishment, is a method to compel the 
production of an item or a person. Subpoenas can be issued by 
administrative agencies with no judicial oversight. The use of a 
subpoena does not afford the Constitutional protections afforded to 
a warrant.  
I. THIRD PARTY DOCTRINE 
An individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy concerning information is 
not absolute. Information loses its Fourth Amendment protections when it is 
“knowingly” exposed to another, which enables the government to obtain access 
without the need for a warrant. Courts have held: 
when an individual reveals private information to another, he 
assumes the risk that his confidant will reveal that information to the 
authorities, and if that occurs the Fourth Amendment does not 
prohibit governmental use of that information. Once frustration of 
the original expectation of privacy occurs, the Fourth Amendment 
does not prohibit governmental use of the now non-private 
information.88  
The Third Party Doctrine codified a proverb attributed to Benjamin Franklin that 
“three may keep a secret, if two of them are dead.”89 
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The Third Party Doctrine is particularly troubling today since most data 
residing in the digital world is transmitted and stored on third party intermediary 
sites. Taken to its logical conclusion, the Third Party Doctrine has the potential to 
deprive an individual of any reasonable expectation of privacy he may have in his 
digital communications, which has led many to call for a reevaluation of the 
Constitutional protections afforded an individual in cyberspace. Recently, 
Supreme Court Justice Sotomayor, concurring in a pivotal Fourth Amendment 
challenge to the government’s warrantless use of Global Positioning System 
(GPS) on a suspect’s car, opined that it may be time to reevaluate the “the 
premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill suited to the 
digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves 
to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.” 90  She further 
declared, “I would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some 
member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to 
Fourth Amendment protection.”91 Although the Court did not decisively resolve 
the issue of the applicability of the Third Party Doctrine to today’s digital 
communications, it is without doubt that the issue will come before the Court in 
the near future. 
J. THREE CATEGORIES OF ONLINE INFORMATION CREATED BY 
KATZ AND THE THIRD PARTY DOCTRINE  
For purposes of government investigations, Katz creates three categories 
of information: (1) open source—information freely accessible from public 
sources, such as newspapers and libraries; (2) Third Party Doctrine—information 
an individual has shared with a third party, and thus, has given up an expectation 
of privacy; and (3) private communications. On the Internet, these three 
categories of information would be (1) first person voluntarily disclosure, in which 
an individual voluntarily makes information available by positing it on a publicly 
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available Internet site; (2) third party disclosure in which an individual discloses 
information to a third party, such as a provider of financial services; and (3) 
private online communications, in which an individual either stores personal data 
online or attempts to have a private conversation with others online. 
It is safe to say that that an individual who openly posts personally 
identifiable information so as to be publicly available on the Internet has 
demonstrated no reasonable expectation of privacy and the information is “open 
source” material. In recognition of the growing availability of “open source” 
information on the Internet, the Department of Justice in 1999 issued guidance to 
its investigators and prosecutors entitled “Online Investigative Principles for 
Federal Law Enforcement Agents”92 that set forth 11 principles governing the 
collection of information online. Generally, the principles provided that agents 
may obtain information without a warrant, “from publicly accessible online 
sources and facilities under the same conditions as they may obtain information 
from other sources generally available to the public.”93 Access did not require 
special legal authority or permission. In addition, agents are permitted to 
“passively observe . . . real-time electronic communications open to the public 
under the same circumstances in which the agent could attend a public 
meeting.”94 The guidelines also provided principles for undercover operations, 
including specifically prohibiting an agent from acquiring or using another 
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guidelines were written prior to the popularity of social networking, these 
guidelines are still relevant to today’s environment and have been adopted by the 
Department of Homeland Security.95 
K. ENACTMENT OF THE FEDERAL WIRETAP LEGISLATION IN LIGHT 
OF KATZ 
In response to the Supreme Court rulings in Berger and Katz and the 
creation of the Third Party Doctrine, Congress attempted to strike a balance 
between the protections afforded an individual by the Fourth Amendment with the 
government’s needs to obtain evidence lawfully by enacting Federal Wiretap 
legislation. The ensuing Federal Wiretap Act regulated federal law enforcement’s 
ability to engage in the interception and electronic capture of oral and wire 
communications in a manner that ensured an individual’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy. Title III of the Omnibus Crime and Safe Streets Act of 1968, The 
Wiretap Act, 96  prohibited the interception or acquisition of data through 
wiretapping, electronic eavesdropping of face-to face conversations, telephone 
conversations, or other wire communications in the absence of a court order.97 
The Wiretap Act provided the authority to perform electronic surveillance in a 
limited number of enumerated crimes when no less restrictive means was 
available.98 
L. THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION PRIVACY ACT 
With the growth in popularity and promise of computer network 
communications, and the increased use of electronic mail (e-mail), Congress saw 
the need to enact legislation that would embed Fourth Amendment like privacy 
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safeguards into federal surveillance laws. The ensuing Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act sought to afford protections to communications that 
were increasingly occurring on third party intermediaries computer networks 
entrusted with the transmission and storage of e-mail.99 Enacted prior to the 
widespread public use of the Internet, ECPA extended federal wiretap restrictions 
to new forms of electronic communications. ECPA protects electronic 
communications from being intercepted or disclosed to another absent a warrant 
or a specific exemption. 100  Title II of ECPA, known as the “the Stored 
Communication Act,” provides protections for electronic communications not in 
transmission but in temporary storage as part of the communications process. 
Although the term “e-mail” was not mentioned in the statute, Congress 
attempted to afford privacy protections to e-mail in part in response to an Office 
of Technology Assessment's 1985 report entitled “Electronic Surveillance and 
Civil Liberties.” The report concluded “current legal protections for electronic mail 
are 'weak, ambiguous, or non-existent,' and that 'electronic mail remains legally 
as well as technically vulnerable to unauthorized surveillance.” 101  Shortly 
thereafter, Congress took legislative action to afford electronic communications 
Fourth Amendment like protections noting:  
A letter sent by first class mail is afforded a high level of protection 
against unauthorized opening by a combination of constitutional 
provisions, case law, and U.S. Postal Service statutes and 
regulations . . . But there are no comparable Federal statutory 
provisions to protect the privacy and security of communications 
transmitted by new non-common carrier communications services 
or new forms of telecommunications and computer technology . . . 
This gap [between postal privacy protections and new technology  
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protections] results in legal uncertainty . . . It may also discourage 
American businesses from developing new innovative forms of 
telecommunications and computer technology.102 
ECPA amended the federal Wire Tap Act to afford Fourth Amendment like 
protections to the fledgling realm of electronic communications. It did so by 
bestowing differing levels of procedural protections depending on the age of the 
communication, whether or not it has been “retrieved” or opened by the recipient, 
or whether it was in “electronic storage.” The statute also required that notice be 
provided to the intended target depending on the level of legal process obtained 
or the age of the communications. 
1. Confounded By ECPA 
The enactment of ECPA reflects the evolution of Fourth Amendment and 
privacy jurisprudence to emerging communications networks. It, however, is the 
last major milestone of that evolution. More than 25 years have passed since 
ECPA; the Internet, which at that time was a toy of the Department of Defense, 
went public in the early 1990s, and society has embarked upon the Information 
Revolution. ECPA is antiquated. It is antiquated not only due to the tremendous 
passage of time moving at “Internet speed,” but also because ECPA was 
antiquated the day it was enacted. The technological developments in Internet 
technologies, occurring at a brilliant speed, have created a conundrum for Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. 
ECPA “is famous (if not infamous) for its lack of clarity,”103 in large part 
because of the differing standards that both private entities and the government 
must meet to obtain access to electronic records. Courts have had difficulty 
applying consistent readings within each title of the Act. For example, while most 
courts agree that a lawful intercept of e-mail under Title I must be 
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contemporaneous with the transmission of the communication, they have 
disagreed on whether an e-mail residing in 'transient electronic storage' prior to 
delivery is afforded procedural protections. Different federal courts of appeal 
have applied ECPA differently to an e-mail in storage while waiting to be 
downloaded from an e-mail server, while sitting in the cloud of a web based e-
mail service, after being downloaded onto an individual's personal computer, 
after the e-mail has been opened, or when the e-mail is delivered by a 
commercial Internet service provider as opposed to a private corporate in-house 
e-mail service. Moreover, courts are just beginning to grapple with whether or not 
ECPA affords protections to communications occurring in social media and other 
cloud computing technologies that did not exist at the time of ECPA’s enactment, 
and if so, how. 
As forward looking as the statute was in 1986, it codified Congress' 
understanding of computer networks as they existed at the time, and has failed to 
consider advancements in technology. 104  Today, policy makers, legislators, 
judges, the law enforcement and intelligence communities, and the public are left 
with an antiquated statute that fails to provide clear standards for the application 
of Fourth Amendment. These safeguards contained within the statute are ill 
suited for today’s Web 2.0 social networking and cloud computing technologies. 
Accordingly, the 5th Circuit described attempts to interpret ECPA as a “search for 
lightning bolts of comprehension [that] traverses a fog of inclusions and 
exclusions which obscures both the parties’ burdens and ultimate goal.”105 
Many pages have been dedicated by experts to unpuzzle ECPA, and such, 
an exegesis does not need to be replicated in this thesis. In the following 
sections, the author provides a brief exploration of the statute to demonstrate its 
limitations and the quandary it has created for the modern digital environment. 
                                            
104 Kerr, “A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator's Guide to 
Amending It.” Neither ECPA's statutory language nor its legislative history makes any reference 
to the Internet. Lupu, “The Wiretap Act and Web Monitoring.” 
105 Briggs v. Am. Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414, 415 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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2. Title I: The Wiretap Act 
Prior to the passage of ECPA, the federal Wiretap Act covered the 
interception of voice and wire communications. ECPA expanded the definition of 
communications to electronic communications including “signs, signals, writings, 
images, sound, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part 
by wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectric or photo-optical systems.”106 E-mail 
and web browsing are examples of electronic communications covered under 
this provision. 
Generally, the statute prohibits the disclosure of a communications to 
anyone other than the intended recipient while it is in transmission. The 
intentional interception of a communication is also prohibited. The Wiretap Act is 
a law governed by exceptions; in this case, the relevant exceptions are that law 
enforcement may obtain access after first obtaining a court order, and parties to 
the communications can consent to disclosure (this becomes relevant to the 
Third Party Doctrine).107  
3. Title II: The Stored Communications Act  
The Stored Communications Act is the most complex of the three statutes. 
It governs how the government can obtain electronic communications in 
electronic storage with Internet service providers, such as Google, AOL and 
Yahoo. It provides standards for access by federal and state law enforcement, 
articulates permissible voluntary disclosure by Internet service providers for such 
things as routine network maintenance,108 and establishes criminal penalties for 
                                            
106 18 U.S.C. § 2510. 
107 See, generally, Robert Cannon, “ECPA Title I: The Wiretap Act: Exceptions,” 
Cybertelecom, 2012, http://www.cybertelecom.org/security/ecpaexception.htm. 
108 An Internet service provider may voluntarily disclose non-content information to non-
governmental entities. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(6). However, voluntary disclosure to a governmental 
entity of content or non-content information is expressly prohibited. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a). 
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the unlawful access to certain types of information. 109  The Stored 
Communications Act applies different standards to content, opened versus 
unopened communications, and two types of non-content data (basic 
subscriber110 versus transactional).111 The Stored Communications Act provides 
maximum protection to the content of electronic communications stored in public 
computing services reflecting Congress’s judgment “that users have a legitimate 
interest in the confidentiality of communications in electronic storage.”112 The 
Stored Communications Act, however, does not apply to an “electronic 
communication [that] is readily accessible to the general public.”113  
As mentioned above, ECPA reflected Congress’ mid-1980s understanding 
of computer networks. For example, ECPA reflects computer networks’ “store-
and-forward” architecture. While Title I of ECPA, the Wiretap Act, covers the 
“forwarding” part of computer communications, Title II, the Stored 
Communications Act, covers the “stored” part.114 An e-mail could be transmitted 
across the network (Title I, Wiretap Act) and could be stored on a receiving e-
                                            
109 See United States Department of Justice, Computer Crime and Intellectual Property 
Section, Criminal Division, “Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Criminal 
Investigations,” 2009. 
110 Basic subscriber data includes: (A) name; (B) address; (C) local and long distance 
telephone connection records, or records of session times and durations; (D) length of service 
(including start date) and types of service utilized; (E) telephone or instrument number or other 
subscriber number or identity, including any temporarily assigned network address (temporarily 
assigned network addresses would include IP numbers); and (F) means and source of payment 
for such service (including any credit card or bank account number). 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2). 
111 Transactional data is the catch-all category for non-content data and includes: historical 
data, websites visited by user, or e-mail addresses with whom the user communicated. 
112 Theofel v. Farley-Jones, 341 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 2003) in which the court analogized 
the protections provided by the Stored Communications Act to those afforded by the law of 
trespass as follows: Like the tort of trespass, the Stored Communications Act protects individuals’ 
privacy and proprietary interests. The Act reflects Congress’s judgment that users have a 
legitimate interest in the confidentiality of communications in electronic storage a communications 
facility. Just as trespass protects those who rent space from a commercial storage facility to hold 
sensitive documents, cf. Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 13, at 78 (W. Page Keeton ed., 
5th ed. 1984), the Act protects users whose electronic communications are in electronic storage 
with an ISP or other electronic communications facility. 
113 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g). See e.g., Kerr, “A User's Guide to the Stored Communications 
Act, and a Legislator's Guide to Amending It,” 1220.  
114 This is a transitional storage pending delivery or further transmission of the message (it is 
not storage of the content after it has been received). 
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mail server (Title II, Stored Communication Act) pending download by the 
recipient. E-mail that remains stored but not accessed by the recipient for less 
than 180 days requires a warrant for access by law enforcement. After 180 days, 
an unretrieved e-mail is deemed abandoned and only an agency level subpoena 
is required.115 If the e-mail is accessed by the recipient, but the e-mail remains 
on the Internet service providers’ servers, law enforcement may obtain the e-mail 
with a mere subpoena provided that the subscriber receives prior notification; no 
notice is required if a warrant is obtained. If the message was downloaded and 
opened by the recipient, and resided on the recipient's personal computer, the 
government would be required to obtain a warrant premised upon probable 
cause to search and seize the physical personal computer in which the e-mail 
was stored. The convoluted contours of the Stored Communications Act’s 
applicability to e-mail and Internet communications confounds even the most well 
versed ECPA experts. 
Disclosure of non-content to anyone other than the government is 
permissible. A governmental entity may obtain basic subscriber information with 
a subpoena issued by a federal grand jury, a federal trial court, or where 
permitted by statute, an administrative subpoena. 116  No notice is required. 
Whereas, transactional data may be obtained by court order provided that the 
requestor can “offer specific and articulable facts showing that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic 
information or the records or other information sought are relevant and material 
to an ongoing investigation.”117 No prior notice is required. 
ECPA also distinguishes between Electronic Communications Services 
(ECS) and Remote Computing Services (RCS), which creates additional 
technology centric procedural requirements. An ECS is defined as “any service 
which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic 
                                            
115 18 U.S.C § 2510(17)(A). 
116 18 U.S.C § 2703(c)(2). 
117 18 U.S.C § 2703(c)(d). 
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communications.”118 Providers of e-mail (Internet Service Providers), telephone 
and text messaging services 119  that provide the ability to send and receive 
communications generally act as ECSs; whereas, RCS means the provision to 
the public of computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic 
communications system. 120  Generally, an RCS is provided by an off-site 
computer that stores or processes data for a customer.121 A service provider that 
allows customers to use its computing facilities in “essentially a time-sharing 
arrangement” provides an RCS. Services that allow users to store data for future 
retrieval also provide an RCS.122 However, an entity that operates a website and 
the services associated with it are not an RCS, unless it also offers storage or 
processing. In any case, an entity is only an RCS if it provides services to the 
public. 
Although cloud computing services were not the norm at the time of 
ECPA’s passage, many of the services provided by and stored in today’s cloud 
would arguably be considered RCS for purposes of ECPA. However, how today’s 
social networking technologies would be classified and what level of review is 
necessary to access transactional data or content may not be so easy to 
determine. For example, would an individual’s Facebook profile be considered a 
communication transmitted by an ECS or rather would it be considered a 
computing service, and therefore, protected under the RCS? The tech centric 
provisions of ECPA make it difficult to apply to new and emerging social network 
technologies. Courts are just beginning to grapple with whether or not ECPA 
                                            
118 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15). 
119 See Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 902-03 (2008) (holding that a 
text messaging service provider was an ECS, and therefore, not an RCS). 
120 18 U.S.C § 2711(2). An electronic communication system is defined in the statute as: any 
wire, radio, electromagnetic, photooptical or phototelectronic facilities for the transmission of wire 
or electronic communications, and any computer facilities or related electronic equipment for the 
electronic storage of such communications. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(14). 
121 See S. Rep. No. 99-541 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3564-65. 
122 See Steve Jackson Games, Inc., 816 F. Supp. at 442–43. 
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affords protections to communications occurring in social media and other cloud 
computing technologies that did not exist at the time of ECPA’s enactment. 
In the case of Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., the Federal Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit articulated its belief that a service provider could 
only be an ECS or an RCS, but not both.123 The court’s “either/or approach” is in 
contravention to Congressional intent.124 The definitions provided in the statute 
were independent of each other. While no one will argue that a provider of e-mail 
services is an ECS, the legislative history suggests that since e-mails stored after 
transmission would be protected by the provisions of the Stored Communications 
Act that protect the contents of communications stored by an RCS, an ECS could 
become an RCS as well.125 In Flagg v. City of Detroit, a federal district court 
adopted this reading of legislative intent by finding that a service provider “may 
be deemed to provide both an ECS and an RCS to the same customer.”126 The 
key to determining whether a social networking or cloud computing service 
provider is an ECS or an RCS is to ascertain what role it has played or is playing 
with respect to the electronic communication. 
The government can compel disclosure of the contents of an electronic 
communications in the storage of an RCS or in the storage of an ECS for greater 
than 180 days in a number of ways: (a) with a warrant, no notice is required; (b) 
an administrative subpoena; (c) a grand jury subpoena; (d) a trial subpoena; or 
(e) a court order issued under Section 2703(d) if the government offers “specific 
and articulable facts showing reasonable grounds to believe” that the 
communications sought are “relevant and material” to an ongoing criminal 
investigation. The government’s ability to obtain content information in the 
absence of a warrant premised upon probable cause negates an individual’s 
                                            
123 Quon, 529 F.3d at 904-08 (finding reasonable expectation of privacy in pager messages 
stored by provider of communication service). 
124 See United States Department of Justice, 2009.  
125 See H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at 65 (1986). 
126 Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 362 (E.D. Mich. 2008). 
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reasonable expectation of privacy, which prompted Professor Orin Kerr to note, 
“[t]he most obvious problem with the current version of the Stored 
Communications Act is the surprisingly weak protection the statute affords to 
compelled contents of communications under the traditional understanding of 
ECS and RCS.”127  
4. Title III: Pen Register Act  
Traditionally, a pen register would capture telephone numbers called from 
a specific number. The Supreme Court in Smith v. Maryland held that no actual 
expectation of privacy in phone numbers dialed exists.128 Congress enacted the 
Pen Register Act to provide standards for access of transactional data 
associated with telephone calls and required the government to obtain a court 
order premised upon a showing that the information obtained is relevant to an 
ongoing investigation. Initially, the statute failed to state specifically that it applied 
to electronic communications transmitted on the Internet, which left many to 
struggle with ascertaining Congressional intent. Subsequently, Section 216 of the 
2001 Patriot Act expanded the scope of a pen register to encompass Internet 
communications more clearly.129 The Pen Register Act as amended, defines pen 
registers as “a device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing, 
addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from 
which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted, provided, however, that 
such information shall not include the contents of any communication.”130 
 
 
                                            
127 Kerr, “A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator's Guide to 
Amending It,” 1233. 
128 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
129 18 U.S.C § 3122(c). 
130 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3). 
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A court order must be obtained to use a pen register or a trap and trace 
device. The application for the order must be made by “an attorney for the 
government” and not the individual law enforcement office. The application must 
demonstrate that the information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing 
criminal investigation being conducted by the agency.131 
The Pen Register Act has failed to keep pace with advancements in 
technology with respect to locational data generated by cell phone and other 
mobile devices. Cell phones generate locational data transmitted to the nearest 
cell phone towers. Cell phones towers capture location data in the course of 
providing service to users. As more and more individuals use their cell phones to 
access social networking technologies, a constant record of their geographical 
whereabouts is created. The Pen Register Act did not adequately articulate a 
standard for governmental access to this type of information, in part because at 
the time of the Act’s passage, cell phone use was extremely limited. At the time 
of the passage of the Act, only 913 cell phone towers existed as compared to 
approximately 251,000 today. 132  Currently, a cell phone can be used as a 
tracking device capable of recording the coming and goings of an individual. 
Many, therefore, believe that governmental access to locational data generated 
by cell phones amounts to a search and seizure necessitating a warrant and 
further illustrating the need to update ECPA to account for the advancement in 
cell phone technologies.133 
                                            
131 18 U.S.C § 3122(b). 
132 See In re Application of the United States of America for Historical Cell Phone Data Site 
Data, 747 F.Supp.2d 827 (S.D. Tex. 2010). 
133 Ibid. District Court ruling that warrant is necessary to obtain cell phone location as it is 
more intrusive than mere GPS data. This ruling is not universally followed throughout the United 
States However, the recent Supreme Court ruling in U.S. v. Jones, January 23, 2012, that law 
enforcement’s use of a GPS tracking device on a suspect’s car without a warrant is 
unconstitutional, it is likely to be persuasive in future law enforcement requests for access to cell 
phone locator information. 
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M. THE USA PATRIOT ACT 
The USA Patriot Act amended portions of ECPA and greatly facilitated the 
government’s ability to obtain access to telephone, e-mail communications, 
medical, financial, and other records, eased restrictions on foreign intelligence 
gathering within the United States and expanded the use of National Security 
Letters that allows the FBI to search telephone, e-mail, and financial records 
without a court order.134 Further, it permitted the delay in notification to the 
subject of the search, and in some cases, no notice at all.  
Note that unlike other milestones in the history of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, the Patriot Act did not increase privacy protections, nor did it 
increase restrains or checks on governmental access and gathering of 
information.135 
                                            
134 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001. 
135 See, generally, Robert Cannon, “The Patriot Act,” Cybertelecom, 2012, 
http://www.cybertelecom.org/security/patriot.htm. 
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IV. “SUBTLER AND MORE FAR-REACHING MEANS OF 
INVADING PRIVACY”136  
In the 25 years since ECPA was enacted, the World Wide Web was 
invented, the Internet was made public by the National Science Foundation, 
Google was invented, the Dot Com boom and bust occurred, and social networks 
and interactive media have exploded. Most significantly, sufficient time has 
transpired that a new generation known as Digital Natives has lived their entire 
lives online. These revolutions in communications have rendered antiquated a 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence developed in the era of the AT&T telephone 
monopoly.  
A. WEB 2.0—SOCIAL MEDIA 
Technological enhancements of Internet technologies have occurred at 
break neck speed. Initially, Web 1.0 technology enabled anyone with minimal 
technical ability to publish to a webpage and communicate the message to 
everyone. Web 2.0137 revolutionized the way people communicated with one 
another by permitting individuals to interact with Internet sites in a collaborative 
                                            
136 Justice Brandeis in the pivotal Olmstead dissenting opinion foreshadowed a time when 
developments in technology would enable far reaching means of governmental surveillance: 
Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available to the 
government. Discovery and invention have made it possible for the government, by means far 
more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in 
the closet. Moreover, 'in the application of a Constitution, our contemplation cannot be only of 
what has been, but of what may be.' The progress of science in furnishing the government with 
the means for espionage is not likely to stop with wiretapping. Ways may someday be developed 
by which the government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in 
court, and by which, it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the 
home. Advances in the psychic and related sciences may bring means of exploring unexpressed 
beliefs, thoughts and emotions. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
137 The Pew Internet and American Life Project defines Web 2.0 as “an umbrella term used 
to refer to a new era of web-enabled applications built around user-generated or user-
manipulated content, such as wikis, blogs, podcasts, and social networking sites.” Aaron Smith, 
“Web 2.0,” The Pew Internet and American Life Project, November 15, 2011, 
http://www.pewinternet.org/topics/Web-20.aspx. The term Web 2.0 was coined during a braining 
storming conference between Tim O’Reilly and Media Live International. Initially, it signified a 
resurgence of the Internet after the Dot.com boom and had nothing to do with the emerging 
technological capabilities. However, the term quickly took hold. See Tim O’Reilly, “What is Web 
2.0. O’Reilly Media,” September 30, 2005, http://oreilly.com/web2/archive/what-is-web-20.html. 
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manner and enabling the creation of “user generated content.” With the advent of 
Web 2.0 technology, everyone can contribute, create, collaborate, and curate 
content. Finally, the growing popularity and adaption of cloud computing has 
transformed information technology, moving both content and applications from 
the desk top computer, secured within an individual’s private home or business, 
to third party server farms located in undisclosed destinations.  
Social networking technologies allow participants to meet others online 
and form communities with individuals who possess similar interests. Just as 
importantly, research has demonstrated that social media is also an effective tool 
to maintain connections with existing friends and family.138 
The first modern day social networking services that enabled users to 
create profiles, to accumulate friends and to surf their friends profiles was 
launched in 1997. SixDegrees.com attracted millions of users but failed to 
maintain itself as a business.139 Friendster was the next major social networking 
service to come on the scene in 2002. Friendster only permitted users to gain 
access to profiles of people no more than four degrees away, which resulted in 
users friending people they did not know to expand their access. However, 
technical difficulties due to its rapid growth in popularity and a rumor that it would 
soon collect fees caused users to jump ship to the emerging Myspace.com. By 
2004, MySpace gained popularity with teenagers with its policies that permitted 
minors to use its services.140 Also in 2004, Facebook came on to the scene with 
its introduction to students on the campus of Harvard. In 2005, Facebook  
 
                                            
138 The Pew Internet and American Life Project found that “two-thirds of adults online use 
social media like Facebook, Twitter, MySpace and LinkedIn, primarily to maintain connections to 
friends and family.” Further, 91% of teens use social networking technologies to connect with 
existing friends. Amanda Lenhart and Mary Madden, “Teens, Privacy & Online Social Networks.” 
Pew Internet and American Life Project, April 18, 2007, 
http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2007/Teens-Privacy-and-Online-Social-Networks.aspx. 
139 danah boyd and Nicole Ellison, “Social Network Sites: Definition, History and 
Scholarship,” Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 13, no. 1, (2007): art. 11, 
http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol13/issue1/boyd.ellison.htm. 
140 Ibid., art. 8. 
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became available to high school students around the country. Today, Facebook 
is the most popular social networking service with more than 845 million users 
worldwide.141 
Social media is an umbrella term that includes many different technologies. 
The following is a brief discussion of some of the more popular types of 
technologies and services in use today. Technologies may provide multiple 
functionalities.  
1. Content Sharing—Allows participants to share different types of 
media. These tools enable users to generate and share “User 
Generated Content.” 142  Examples include Youtube for sharing 
videos, Flickr for sharing photos and Deviant Art for sharing art.  
2. Discussion—Text messaging, video chatting/ conferencing. 
Examples include Yahoo messenger, Google talk and Skype. 
3. Social Networks-—perhaps the most commonly used social 
networking technology. Examples include Facebook, MySpace, 
Linkedin and Google+.  
4. MicroBlogging—Mini publishing that enables quick and frequent 
sharing and has helped to provide officials and the public with on 
the ground situational awareness during natural emergencies, such 
as the earthquake and tsunami in Japan, as well in man-made 
emergencies, such as the uprisings in Iran and Egypt. Examples 
include Twitter, which is limited to 140 characters and Tumblr. 
5. Location-based networks—Used for reviewing businesses, as well 
to report and track an individual’s attendance at a site. Examples 
include Four Square and Yelp. 
6. Social Games—Stand-alone or applications on other social network 
platforms. Examples include Farmville and Mob Wars. 
7. Virtual Worlds—Online environments that make it possible to create 
personalities or avatars, and interact with other personalities or 
avatars. Examples include Second Life, There and Imvu. 
                                            
141 Facebook, (n.d.). “Statistics,” http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics. 
142 According to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, User 
Generated Content must possess three salient characteristics: (1) It must be published on a 
website or social networking site available to selected group of people; (2) it needs to show a 
certain amount of creative effort; and (3) it needs to have been created outside of professional 
routines and practices. Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, “Participative 
Web: User-generated content. OECD Committee for Information, Computer and Communications 
Policy report, DSTI/ICCP/IE(2006)7/FINAL,” April 2007, 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/14/38393115.pdf. 
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8. Massive Multiplayer Online Games—Combination of social games 
and virtual worlds. Usually a common goal or community exists in 
which participants can interact with one another. Examples include 
World of Warcraft, Webkinz and Club Penguin.143 
Social networking services typically permit individuals to create profiles for 
themselves. These profiles may contain personal information, as well as the lists 
of “friends” or others that they maintain contact with online. Many services enable 
users to exercise some measure of control over those they chose to share their 
profiles by invoking available privacy settings. Regardless of the privacy settings 
a user selects, service providers, pursuant to their “terms of use” agreements, 
often retain the ability to access and collect user’s data so that they can deliver 
targeted advertising to the user, and thus, can raise revenues to sustain its 
operations. Typically, these agreements are lengthy, complicated, and difficult to 
understand, which casts doubt on whether users are providing meaningful 
consent.144 Prof. Lorrie Cranor noted, “[o]nline privacy policies are difficult to 
understand. Most privacy policies require a college reading level and an ability to 
decode legalistic, confusing, or jargon-laden phrases.”145 Buried within the terms 
of use agreements is frequently language in which providers include their policies 
for responding to requests from law enforcement.146 Privacy disclosure policies 
vary from site to site. 
 
                                            
143 O’Neill Communication, “All the Different Types of Social Media,” (n.d.), 
http://www.oneillcommunications.com/2010/04/all-the-different-types-of-social-media/. 
144 See Aleecia M. McDonald and Lorrie F. Cranor, “The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies,” 
ACM Transactions on Computer-Human Interaction 389, no. 3 (2008): 1, 
http://www.mendeley.com/research/the-cost-of-reading-privacy-policies/. Calculating that if all the 
privacy policies encounter in a year are read, it would take 76 work days, or on a national basis of 
work hours, a cost in terms of work hours $54 billion. 
145 Lorrie F. Cranor, Patrick Gage Kelley, Aleecia M. McDonald, and Robert W. Reeder, “A 
Comparative Study of Online Privacy Policies and Formats,” Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 
5672/2009, 37-55, DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-03168-7_3, 2009, 
http://www.springerlink.com/content/e2640gw68436054k/. 
146 See Facebook, “Information for Law Enforcement Authorities,” 2012, 
https://www.facebook.com/safety/groups/law/guidelines/.’ See also Google, “Privacy Policy,” 2012, 
https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/privacy. 
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Both Facebook and Google provide notice of their policy with respect to 
disclosure to the government: 
• For legal reasons: We will share personal information with 
companies, organizations or individuals outside of Google if we 
have a good-faith belief that access, use, preservation or disclosure 
of the information is reasonably necessary to:  
• meet any applicable law, regulation, legal process or 
enforceable governmental request.  
• enforce applicable Terms of Service, including investigation 
of potential violations.  
• detect, prevent, or otherwise address fraud, security or 
technical issues.  
• protect against harm to the rights, property or safety of 
Google, our users or the public as required or permitted by 
law. 
The control and collection of data pertaining to an individual is an aspect 
of the expectation of privacy in cyberspace that is the subject of a huge debate 
currently occurring in Congress, academia, corporate boardrooms, and homes 
across this country.147 Although the Third Party Doctrine would arguably negate 
an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in communications occurring in 
social media, courts are beginning to consider whether or not an individual has 
invoked available privacy settings in determining whether an individual intends 
personal communications to be private.148 
                                            
147 Although not considered within this thesis, it should be noted that currently a raging 
debate is going on about whether an individual is entitled to consumer privacy or control over 
personal information in the custody of third party service providers. This debate prompted the 
White House to propose a privacy framework for consumer data. It should be noted that unlike 
like the government, third party service providers are not bound by Constitutional restraints. See 
The White House, “Consumer Data Protection in a Networked World: A Framework for Protecting 
Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Digital World Economy,” February 23, 2012, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf. 
148 Crispin v. Audigier, 717 F.Supp.2d 965 (2010). In a case of first impression, a district 
court held that the Stored Communications Act does afford protections to private communications 
occurring in social media and shielding the contents from disclosure in a civil matter. The court 
dismissed the suit pending an examination of whether the generator of the content provider 
invoked available privacy protections, and thus, evidenced an expectation of privacy. The district 
court decision is not binding on other courts  
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Finally, in the very near future, Internet technologies will evolve to a new 
level with the advent of Web 3.0 technologies and “the semantic web,”149 a term 
coined by one of the original pioneers of the Internet, Sir Ted Berners-Lee. The 
extent of the new functionalities that will become available with Web 3.0, or the 
semantic web, is still unknown. However, they will most likely enable machines to 
read web pages to better tailor the computing experience for the user. While 
some theorize that if constructed properly, privacy considerations can be can 
embed into emerging Web 3.0 technologies (privacy by design), others fear that 
the consolidation of so much data will make surveillance much easier.  
1. Cloud Computing 
Social media is enabled by the availability of remote computing resources 
owned and operated by third party service providers. The concept of cloud 
computing or the ability to leverage computer services and storage on remote 
systems is not a new concept. The developers of the ARPANET, the first packet 
switched network that evolved into the early Internet, envisioned the concept. 
Larry Roberts, one of the early pioneers of the ARPANET, predecessor to the 
Internet, described the ARPANET as follows: 
The data sharing between data management systems or data 
retrieval systems will begin an important phase in the use of the 
Network. The concept of distributed databases and distributed 
access to the data is one of the most powerful and useful 
applications of the network for the general data processing 
community. As described above, if the Network is responsive in the 
human time frame, databases can be stored and maintained at a 
remote location rather than duplicating them at each site the data is 






                                            
149 The Semantic Web, a collaborative effort of W3C and industry partners, “provides a 
common framework that allows data to be shared and reused across application, enterprise, and 
community boundaries.” See W3C, “W3C Semantic Web Activity,” 2011, 
http://www.w3.org/2001/sw/. 
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local, but also as a Network user he can write programs on his own 
machine to collect data from a number of locations for comparison, 
merging or further analysis.150 
Internet protocols were developed to enable ARPA-funded researchers to share 
computer resources and research. Web 2.0 technologies merely created a new 
demand for bigger and better remote servers that gave birth to a new market of 
private and public sector services.  
The National Institute for Standards and Technology has defined cloud 
computing as “a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network 
access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, 
servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and 
released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction.”151 It 
provides “a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a 
shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, 
storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released 
with minimal management effort or cloud provider interaction.”152 
Cloud computing has enabled individuals to store more and more data on 
remote third party services located in “the cloud,” as well as to perform 
computing tasks remotely. Today, individuals conduct their banking online 
utilizing services located in the cloud. In addition, graduate and other students 
can compose and store their work product remotely in the cloud. The storage of 
data on third party servers has resulted in new challenges to an individual’s 
ability to maintain control of data, which calls into question privacy concerns not 
addressed by outdated laws. 
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Pursuant to the Third Party Doctrine, from the 1968 Katz Supreme Court 
case, should the privacy protection for what used to be contained in an 
individual’s private papers be diminished because they are now stored in the 
desk of another, i.e., a cloud provider? Or does an individual’s actions 
(establishing password protections and setting privacy settings) manifest the 
content owner’s reasonable expectation of privacy as envisioned in Katz? David 
A. Couillard in “Defogging the Cloud: Applying Fourth Amendment Principles to 
Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud Computing” suggests that cloud service 
providers should be viewed as “virtual landlords.”153 Although a user may be 
interacting with a service provider when utilizing online calendars, photo storage, 
document storage, or blogging services, it is not the intent of the user to provide 
access to the content with the provider. “The provider is merely providing a 
platform for using and storing the content via the cloud.” In the same way that a 
tenant does not expect that a lock will keep out a landlord, neither will the use of 
a password; rather, it is the operation of applicable law that ensures the privacy 
of an individual.154 
Nonetheless, in light of the judicially recognized Third Party Doctrine, an 
individual’s expectation of privacy for computing activities occurring and stored in 
third party cloud computing services is all but non-existent. While an e-mail 
stored on a home computer would be fully protected by the Fourth Amendment 
warrant requirement, an e-mail or other digital communications stored on a 
remote, cloud computing server may not be.155 In an era in which more and more 
commercial entities are storing their clients’ information in the cloud or inviting 
their clients to do so, some have asserted that the diminished expectation of 
privacy that comes from the ease by which authorities or others can access 
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personal information may have a chilling effect on societal tolerance of having 
their data stored by commercial entities in the cloud. In Congressional testimony 
on the need to amend ECPA, Professor Kevin Werbach remarked that “cloud 
computing represents a new stage in the evolution of that economy” and for it to 
be successful, “a smooth transition to cloud computing requires users to continue 
feeling a sense of trust online.” He noted further, “though it is fashionable to 
assert that today’s young people are unconcerned about privacy, research shows 
that in many ways they feel even more strongly about the need to control their 
personal information than their elders.”156 
2. Privacy and Social Media 
Privacy as a concept has always been difficult to define. As history has 
demonstrated, societal notions of privacy are not always in alignment with 
Constitutional notions of privacy. Little consensus exists on an exact meaning.157 
In 1967, Prof. Alan Westin declared “few values so fundamental to society as 
privacy have been left so undefined in social theory or have been the subject of 
such vague and confused writing by social scientists.”158 Prof. Daniel Solove 
declared, “[p]rivacy is a concept in disarray.”159 “Privacy seems to be about 
everything and therefore it appears to be about nothing.”160 While danah boyd 
asserts that privacy “is about how people experience their relationship with 
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context where sharing takes place, and the audience who can gain access. 
Information is not private because no one knows it; it is private because the 
knowing is limited and controlled.”161 
However defined, privacy is a cherished value critical to a free society. 
With the advent of the Internet, and subsequently, with social networking 
technologies, the concept of privacy and an individual’s “reasonable expectation 
of privacy” as recognized in Katz are on a collision course. Despite the 
collaborative nature of social networking technologies, researchers have 
debunked the notion that users of these services have no reasonable expectation 
of privacy, ala, the first prong of the Katz test. Young people, as early adopters 
and the most active users of social media,162 have demonstrated their desire to 
shield their information from unwanted attention by employing a variety of 
methods, while others of all ages have chosen to engage in anonymous activities 
online or have elected to use pseudonyms and encryption techniques to 
effectuate privacy. It has become commonplace to achieve some level of privacy 
by concealing personal information, avoiding providing information pursuant to 
unnecessary inquiries, or, when forced to provide answers, simply lying. While 
courts struggle to determine what level of protections communications occurring 
in social media should be afforded, individuals have worked hard at creating 
walls around information in an attempt to exclude unwanted eyes. 
3. Digital Natives and Privacy 
One segment of the population worthy of note is that which has become 
known as the “Digital Native. ““Digital Natives” are those who were born into and 
raised in a digital world and who are “native speakers’ of the digital language of 
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computer, video games, and the Internet.”163 Today, young people are living their 
lives in cyberspace mediated by social networking technologies. danah boyd, an 
ethnographer and social media researcher, has conducted extensive research on 
the online habits of today’s youth, has written about their online practices, social 
behaviors, and expectations of privacy, and how they attempt to manage it as 
they navigate through cyberspace. In a two and half year ethnographic study of 
American teens’ engagement with social network sites, she examined their habits 
online, how they socialized with their peers and how they navigated their way 
through adult society. She observed that teens used social media to gossip, flirt, 
joke around, share information, and to simply hang out.164 Their activities in 
social networking site created a “networked public” defined as: (1) the space 
constructed through networked technologies, and (2) the imagined community 
that emerges as a result of the intersection of people, technology, and 
practice.165 Further, she asserts that the networked public supports many of the 
same activities as “unmediated publics.” Further, boyd notes that four unique 
properties and three dynamic properties emerge from their structure, which are 
persistence, searchability, replicability, and scalability of information posted in 
social media sites and three dynamics that arise from online social interactions, 
which are invisible audiences, collapsed contexts, and the blurring of public and 
private.166 These attributes test the notion of privacy in ways not previously 
imaginable. 
boyd’s research has debunked the prevailing notion that young people do 
not care about privacy, for if they did, why would they portray so much 
information about themselves on Facebook? She argues that young people very 
much care about their privacy and have developed elaborate strategies to create 
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a sense of privacy in the networked world. “All teens have a sense of privacy, 
although their definitions of privacy vary widely.”167 “They believe that privacy 
has to do with their ability to control a social situation, how information flows and 
where they can be observed by others.”168 boyd notes that young people accept 
that they are being watched.169 Many even enjoy the attention they receive. 
Nevertheless, they are concerned about the ability of others to hold any control 
over them and struggle to maintain agency over their online presence.  
Young people employ various techniques to effectuate a semblance of 
control over information pertaining to them generated, communicated and stored 
in social media. boyd notes the complexities involved with doing so in 
cyberspace declaring: 
privacy is not about structural limitations to access; it is about being 
able to limit access through social conventions. This approach 
makes sense if you recognize that networked publics make it nearly 
impossible to have structurally enforced borders. However, this is 
not to say that teens do not also try to create structural barriers.170  
Young people have adopted ingenious methods to restrict access by 
fabricating pertinent personal information, as well as by controlling with whom 
they wish to be friends. boyd notes that teens have crafted two types of 
strategies to effectuate control, and therefore, arguably a semblance of privacy 
over their information. The first is structural. Teens limit access by controlling to 
whom they provide access and by deleting content. They may also seek to 
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employ more strategic techniques by limiting access to the message itself, using 
coded language (a form of social steganography),171 or hiding in plain sight.172 
However, teens have a more limited view of from whom they are trying to 
safeguard their information. They believe that by setting their privacy settings, 
they are restricting access to strangers and to eavesdroppers. They are often 
unaware of the extent to which third parties may access their online content.173 
Teens are not always cognizant that their information is constantly accessed by 
and monetized by social media sites and the firms with whom they conduct 
business and, depending on the provider’s terms of use agreements, may be 
provided pursuant to a request from law enforcement. 
John Palfrey and Urs Gasser in Born Digital assert that digital natives who 
have lived their lives “mediated by digital technologies”174 face increasingly more 
difficulty with protecting their privacy as information pertaining to them is 
compiled in what they call “digital dossiers.” In the absence of Congressional 
action, the level of process necessary for the government to obtain information 
stored in these third-party digital dossiers has the potential to negate any 
expectation of privacy young people and their older counterparts have in their 
digitally stored information, which is becoming more and more problematic as 
more information is captured and stored in cyberspace. 
Finally, the disclosure of personal information that an individual has taken 
affirmative steps to protect and subjectively believes will remain private can result 
in harm to an individual’s sense of dignity. Michael Zimmer, in “But the Data is 
Already Public,” examined the ethical issues and the impact to the expectation of 
privacy stemming from the release of personal information data researchers had 
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collected from Facebook accounts of the entire student body at Harvard.175 The 
researchers had obtained access to this information through the cooperation of 
the university but without obtaining permission from any of the students. The 
researchers removed basic personal identifiers, such as name and identification 
numbers of their subjects, prior to the publication of thief findings in an article 
entitled “Tastes, Ties, and Time,” “a cultural, multiplex, and longitudinal social 
network dataset.”176 Distribution of the findings was limited to fellow researchers. 
Within a few days, much of the data had been de-anonymized 177  and the 
identities of many of the students were ascertained. The researches maintained 
that they had not committed any ethical violations, betrayed any trust nor 
diminished any of the students’ privacy interests as the information had already 
been voluntarily posted by the students on a social networking site. Zimmer’s 
account of the researchers’ use and release of the data set examined the 
expectation of privacy held by the students, many of whom had set their privacy 
settings set to limit the disclosure of their postings. Zimmer dismissed the 
researchers’ argument that their actions were nothing more intrusive than had 
they sat in a town square observing the comings and goings of people. In a town 
square, encounters are random, whereas the researchers had accessed a 
complete targeted demographic group. Further, Zimmer considered the concept 
of harm and dignity based view of privacy. He noted that even though information 
had been “de-identified,” was provided only to fellow academics that agreed to 
limit the use of the information, and had not been the subject of a hacker, “merely 
having one’s personal information stripped from the intended sphere of the social 
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networking profile, and amassed into a database for external review becomes an 
affront to the subject’s human dignity and their ability to control the flow of their 
personal information.” 178  Zimmer’s analysis provides additional support to 
demonstrate that even though young people utilize the third party services of 
social media to communicate their thoughts and beliefs, their election of privacy 
settings demonstrated their expectation of privacy. 
4. Techniques That Enable Users to Assert a Semblance of 
Control Over Online Communications—Anonymity and 
Pseudonymity  
The ability to participate in civil society without fear of governmental 
reprisal is a fundamental democratic principle. Individuals who feared harm or 
retribution for the expression of their ideas have long employed anonymous and 
pseudonymous techniques. Anonymity or pseudonymity can enhance an 
individual’s ability to participate in the democratic process by serving as a “shield 
from the tyranny of the majority,” and as such, is protected by the First 
Amendment.179  It can also equalize factors that can diminish an individual’s 
credibility, such as race, religion, or age. A number of prominent Founding 
Fathers chose to publish what would become the blue print for the fledgling new 
government in the Federalist papers. They did so under the pseudonym of 
Publius.  
Tracking and monitoring technologies available today enable the 
government to collect large volumes of information about an individual’s activities 
in social media. In the absence of updated laws and policies to ensure Fourth 
Amendment like protections for communications occurring in social media, 
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individuals may feel constrained in exercising their freedom of expression when 
knowing that their thoughts and ideas could be monitored, scrutinized, and 
retained long term. Tools enabling anonymous communications in cyberspace, 
as well as the use of pseudonyms, can empower individuals to express their 
views more freely. 
Today, communicating online anonymously or behind the cloak of a 
pseudonym, can protect an individual from unwarranted governmental 
scrutiny.180 Recently, tools enabling anonymous communication in cyberspace 
have been used throughout the world to enable political dissidents to 
communicate with the outside world without fear of discovery or reprisal from 
their home governments. Repressive regimes, such as China, Iran, Burma, 
Vietnam and several Middle Eastern countries, are censoring Internet 
communications and search results, jailing journalists and activists, and imposing 
laws that restrict online discourse and access to information. 181  Threats to 
Internet freedom are growing in number and complexity.182 Repressive regimes, 
such as China and Iran, have developed their own methods for curtailing their 
citizens’ access to the Internet, requiring dissidents to engage in a dynamic game 
of cat and mouse, altering their methods of access, and staying one step ahead 
of government detection. Anonymity provides an individual protection from the 
threat of peril or physical harm. Similarly, anonymity provides individuals in the 
United States a method to communicate without fear of reprisal or public ridicule 
fostering democratic ideals by enabling individuals who otherwise would not feel 
comfortable engaging in speech that may be controversial or just plain 
embarrassing. 
                                            
180 Jisuk Woo, “The Right Not To Be Identified: Privacy and Anonymity in the Interactive 
Media Environment,” New Media & Society 8, no. 6 (2006): 949–967, 
http://www.forum.newmediaandsociety.com. 
181 See Reporters Without Borders, “Enemies of the Internet: Countries Under Surveillance,” 
March 12, 2010, http://en.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/Internet_enemies.pdf. 
182 Department of State, “Internet Freedom, About Internet Freedom at the State 
Department,” Remarks by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, February 15, 2011, 
http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/cip/netfreedom/index.htm. 
  69
The use of a pseudonym on social media sites is another way individuals 
can communicate without fear of discovery or reprisal. Pseudonymity is the 
practice of keeping an identity private and unlinked and may include the use of 
fictional names or identities. Pseudonyms provide a mask to hide behind and 
enable individuals to explore their boundaries in cyberspace without fear of being 
discovered. The use of pseudonyms provides a structural protection for an 
individual’s privacy that may not otherwise be assured.183 Pseudonyms have 
been used throughout history by many notable individuals to produce writings or 
works of art without fear of political, religious, or social reprisal. In the 18th 
century, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay wrote under the 
name of Publius and published The Federalist Papers. 184  In 19th century 
England, the Brontë sisters published under pseudonyms to obtain credibility in 
their work during a time in history when women were not taken seriously. 
The use of these techniques is not without shortcomings. In as much as 
anonymity and pseudonymity provide individuals with the courage to express 
opinions they may not otherwise feel free to voice, these tools can also be used 
for disreputable purposes. Hiding behind the cloak of invisibility can provide bad 
actors a license to plan acts of terrorism or other criminal activities 185  with 
apparent impunity. The actions of Internet hactivists,186 such as Anonymous and 
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LulzSec, have presented challenges to the law enforcement community. Cyber-
bullying and anonymous hate-mail can also be facilitated by the ability to 
communicate anonymously. Nevertheless, free speech must always be balanced 
against potential harms to society at large.187 
However, true anonymity is difficult to achieve. In today’s technological 
environment, an individual’s true identity may be difficult to hide. Internet Protocol 
(IP) addresses in and of themselves can tell a lot about a user. Each computer 
on the Internet is assigned a unique address somewhat similar to a street 
address or telephone number. The IP address is captured by every computer or 
server that a user connects with and can be traced.188  
Proxy servers, such as TOR (The Onion Router), have been utilized by 
individuals seeking to communicate their opinions without fear of surveillance or 
detection.189 “TOR is a network of virtual tunnels that allows people and groups 
to improve their privacy and security on the Internet.” 190  TOR works by 
transmitting an encrypted message through participating nodes on the TOR 
network so that a message’s origins are obscured. However, proxy servers are 
not fool proof and can be defeated, and thus, enable the identity of the sender to 
be compromised.191 
The Internet has always provided individuals with the opportunity to 
express themselves anonymously or behind the cloak of a pseudonym. At the 
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same time, with more and more terrorist and other criminal actors using the 
Internet in furtherance of their nefarious aims, anonymity and psuedonymity have 
made surveillance of the electronic communications more difficult for the law 
enforcement and intelligence communities. Striking the right balance between 
techniques that facilitate the ability to participate in the democratic process 
against the need to keep this nation safe from acts of terrorism or other criminal 
actions is becoming increasingly more important. 
5. Delete Button—The Right to be Forgotten 
One of the intriguing debates about privacy currently underway is whether 
an individual should have the right to have information pertaining to himself 
deleted from the Internet and other repositories of personal information, and 
whether a “delete” option is even possible. The ability to delete posted 
information, or to limit the retention period of pertinent information that others 
have captured after the initial justification for its capture in no longer valid, is 
another method for asserting control over personal information and for achieving 
a semblance of privacy. In particular, many believe that young people who may 
not always have the wisdom to understand the enduring nature of 
communications online, should be permitted to redact, or otherwise, limit 
information pertaining to themselves.192 
During World War II, the Europeans learned the hard way the harm that 
can come from the collection of information about its citizens. Due to the 
population registries maintained by the Dutch and other countries that collected 
an individual’s name, birth date, address, and religion, the Nazis were able 
adeptly to locate tens of thousands of Jews for transfer to the death camps.193 
Due to the painful lesson of the 20th century, the European Union is currently 
considering the ability to delete an individual’s information online. As such, on 
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January 25, 2012, the European Commission proposed an amendment to the 
1995 Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC194 which, if adopted, would provide an 
individual the “Right to Erasure.” 195  Article 16 of the proposed Amendment 
provides as follows: 
Right to erasure 
1.  Member States shall provide for the right of the data subject to 
obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data relating to 
them where the processing does not comply with the provisions 
adopted pursuant to Articles 4 (a) to (e), 7 and 8 of this Directive. 
2.  The controller shall carry out the erasure without delay.196 
The impact of the proposal will undoubtedly greatly influence information 
flows as more and more information is being stored in the cloud outside of the 
territorial boundaries of both service providers and the individual to whom the 
information pertains.  
While the delete option presents an appealing prospect for limiting the 
retention of digital communications, the technological feasibility of the concept is 
doubtful. By its nature, communications occurring in social media can be stored 
in a multitude of locations, some intentionally and others unintentional. At a 
minimum, it is stored on the third party service provider, in the author’s accounts 
and in those of confidents or friends. Account user’s information may also be sold 
to data aggregators and merchants to market products to the users. Even if it 
were possible to delete a user’s, projects like “The Way Back Machine,” available 
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at www.archive.org, catalogues widespread segments of the Internet for posterity, 
which can make the deletion of information in any streamlined manner very 
difficult. The Way Back Machine project is “building a digital library of Internet 
sites and other cultural artifacts in digital form.”197 Arguably, such projects may 
not have access to information hidden behind passwords. However, with storage 
becoming cheaper, social networking and cloud computing services are retaining 
information indefinitely. 
Further, the deletion of information implicates competing values. Although 
the deletion of information can afford an individual control over personal 
information, and therefore, a semblance of privacy, it may trample another’s First 
Amendment protected speech.198 The very nature of communications online is 
that it involves interacting with others. It may not be possible to extricate 
communications that have been interwoven into discussions with others without 
trampling on their First Amendment rights. Caroline Kennedy and Ellen Alderman 
in The Right to Privacy noted that often in cases in which invasion of privacy is 
asserted, competing values might be at stake that could override privacy 
interests. “Privacy may seem paramount to the person who has lost it but that 
right often clashes with other rights and responsibilities that we as a society 
deem important.”199 
6. Reconstituting Privacy  
Traditionally, privacy has been viewed as an individual centric value, i.e., 
freedom from unwarranted search and seizure (trespass), the right to be left 
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alone (solitude and intimacy, and reserve and anonymity), 200  an individual’s 
“reasonable expectation of privacy,” ala Katz. v. U.S.201 and, more recently, the 
right to control pertinent personal information.202 In 1967, Prof. Alan Westin in 
Privacy and Freedom posited a ground breaking theory that privacy is the control 
over personal information. He defined privacy as: 
the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for 
themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them 
is communicated to others. Viewed in terms of the relation of the 
individual to social participation, privacy is the voluntary and 
temporary withdrawal of a person form the general society through 
physical or psychological means either in a state of solitude or 
small group intimacy, or when among larger groups in condition of 
anonymity or resolve.203 
Westin qualified this definition by noting “an individual’s desire for privacy 
is never absolute, since participating in society is an equally powerful desire.”204 
Social media has greatly enhanced the ability to participate in society by 
facilitating the formation of and participation in online communities. At the same 
time, the storage and aggregation of vast amounts of personal data in third party 
services has significantly altered an individual’s ability to maintain control over 
data pertaining to oneself, and has adversely impacted the legally recognizable 
expectation of privacy. Nevertheless, the principles embedded in the Fourth 
Amendment, the protection of the individual from the strong arm of the sovereign, 
remain as pertinent today as in the days of the Founding Fathers. 
In today’s networked world, these traditional notions are no longer 
adequate. With information flowing freely from the individual to the commercial 
sector and to governmental entities, as well as to an individual’s friends in e-mail 
                                            
200 Brandeis and Warren, “The Right to Privacy.” See also Donald R. Zoufal, ““Someone to 
Watch Over Me?” Privacy and Governance Strategies for CCTB and Emerging Surveillance 
Technologies (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008). 
201 Katz v. U.S. 
202 Helen Nissenbaum, “Privacy As Contextual Integrity,” Wash. L. Rev. 79, no. 119 (2004), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=139144. 
203 Westin, Privacy and Freedom, 7. 
204 Ibid. 
  75
and social media, control over personal information becomes much more difficult 
to achieve. Valerie Steeves, in Reclaiming the Social Value of Privacy, opines 
that privacy is a dynamic socially constructed process in which an individual 
negotiates “personal boundaries in intersubjective relations.” 205  This dynamic 
process is being conducted in a myriad of different ways in cyberspace. As was 
noted by danah boyd, today’s social media users employ a host of structural and 
strategic practices to limit and control who may access information they 
communicate in social media.206 
These discussions of privacy, however, miss the mark. They miss the 
mark because, as with Katz, they remain focused in one way or another on the 
individual, and whether the individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy. 
While focusing on the individual when it comes to an individual’s privacy may 
seem obviously intuitive, it is also why current dialogue is trapped in a regressive 
logical loop. A Fourth Amendment analysis of privacy that focuses solely on a 
Katz expectation of privacy test cannot resolve the Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudential conundrum confronted by modern interactive communications 
because it has neglected that the Fourth Amendment is about a restraint on 
government power. The Fourth Amendment asks the question, not just does a 
personal expectation of privacy exist, but also why does the government need to 
know? The Fourth Amendment recognizes, as the colonists recognized with the 
King, as Brandeis recognized with the telephone, and as Europe recognized with 
the Nazis, information is power. Likewise a government, which has unbridled 
access to personal information, is a government bound for totalitarianism. 
Information in the hands of the sovereign is a powerful, but dangerous thing. The 
                                            
205 Valerie Steeves, Reclaiming the Social Value of Privacy, Lessons from the Identity Trail, 
ch. 1 (Oxford University Press, 2009), 
http://www.idtrail.org/files/ID%20Trail%20Book/9780195372472_kerr_11.pdf. 
206 A recent survey revealed that 58% of social media users report limiting with whom they 
share information with women being “more likely to choose private settings.” See Mary Madden, 
“Privacy Management on Social Media Sites,” Pew Internet and American Life Project, February 
24, 2012, http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2012/Privacy-management-on-social-media.aspx; 
Woodrow N. Hartzog and Frederic D. Stutzman, “Boundary Regulation in Social Media,” The 
University of North Carolina At Chapel Hill, October 8, 2009, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1566904. 
  76
Fourth Amendment recognized the necessity of the sovereign to access 
information with probable cause. Where a government has not demonstrated 
probable cause with which to answer why it needs to know, access to private 
information is denied as a check on power. Privacy analysis must move past 
Katz, past a mere analysis of a personal expectation of privacy, and return to a 
concern for limitations of governmental power. 
B. PROBABLE CAUSE 2.0 
The Fourth Amendment was written by the Founding Fathers who were 
suspect of unrestrained government surveillance. The Fourth Amendment is a 
Constitutional analysis that balances the privacy interests of the individual 
against the need of government to serve the public good. The restraint of the 
Fourth Amendment is that to transgress the privacy of the individual, the 
government must establish probable cause. Probable cause is defined as 
follows:  
The amount and quality of information police must have before they 
can search or arrest without a warrant. Most of the time, police 
must present their probable cause to a judge or magistrate, whom 
they ask for a search or arrest warrant. Information is reliable if it 
shows that it's more likely than not that a crime has occurred and 
the evidence sought exists at the place named in the search 
warrant, or that the suspect named in the arrest warrant has 
committed a crime.207 
How implementation of this Constitutional policy has historically evolved to 
match the privacy expectations of individuals and how social media has turned 
those expectations of privacy upside down has been explored. This section turns 
to probable cause itself and the use of social media for surveillance. 
1. The Dark Web 
The Internet has provided unprecedented access to ideas and information. 
However, for all the advantages the Internet provides, the Internet and social 
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networking sites are increasingly being utilized by terrorist entities for recruiting, 
planning, financing, and execution of terrorist acts,208 as well as to gather military 
and political intelligence on intended targets.209 In “Terrorist Financing and the 
Internet,” Michael Jacobson asserts that terrorist organizations, such as Al 
Qaeda, are increasingly relying on the Internet “to spread its toxic message and 
drum up support throughout the world.”210 
Prof. Gabriel Weimann from the University of Haifa has engaged in a 
decade-long study211 of the encoded and public Internet sites of international 
terrorism organizations and groups that support them, as well as social media 
sites on Facebook, Twitter, chat rooms, YouTube, and MySpace. Prof. Weimann 
maintains, “today, about 90 percent of organized terrorism on the Internet is 
being carried out through social media.” By using these tools, the organizations 
are able to be active in recruiting new “friends” without geographical 
limitations.”212 Prof. Weimann explains that: 
when it comes to terrorism online, [terrorist organizations] used to 
apply a pull strategy; waiting in chat rooms for supporters, 
interested people, and members of the group to join in. Today, 
using the social networks, they can actually come to you. That is, 
using the social nature of Facebook, a page opens to another page, 
and so on. Friends and friends of friends, like widening circles, all 
become a huge social web. They can use all that by getting only 
the first to post the messages they want.213 
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Ironically, “the most advanced of Western communication technology is, 
paradoxically, what the terror organizations are now using to fight the West,” Prof. 
Weimann said.214 
In an attempt to identify and track terrorist activities on the web, the 
University of Arizona’s Artificial Intelligence lab in coordination with the National 
Science Foundation, instituted the “Dark Web” Project.215 The Dark Web utilizes 
a number of tools to identify and track online communications of terrorist 
organizations. These include the use of a tool called Writeprint, as well as the 
use of web spiders. Writeprint automatically extracts thousands of multilingual, 
structural, and semantic features to determine who is creating 'anonymous' 
content online. Writeprint can look at a posting on an online bulletin board, for 
example, and compare it with writings found elsewhere on the Internet. By 
analyzing these certain features, it can determine with more than 95% accuracy if 
the author has produced other content in the past. The system can then alert 
analysts when the same author produces new content, as well as where on the 
Internet the content is being copied, linked to or discussed. Dark Web also uses 
complex tracking software called Web spiders to search discussion threads and 
other content to find the corners of the Internet in which terrorist activities are 
occurring. 
In 2007, the Project Lab estimated that between 7,000 and 8,000 websites 
“created and maintained by known international terrorist groups, including Al-
Qaeda, the Iraqi insurgencies, and many homegrown terrorist cells in Europe.”216 
By 2010, the number had grown to 100,000 sites that contained extremist or 
terrorist content with the largest growth in Web 2.0 enabled “forums, videos, 
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blogs, virtual worlds etc.”217 Dorothy E. Denning, in “Terror’s Web: How the 
Internet is Transforming Terrorism,” asserts that the Internet is “fundamentally 
transforming terrorism.” 218  Terrorist groups are using a variety of Internet 
functionalities from static websites and social networking sites to chat rooms, 
message boards and blogs to accomplish their aims. Making similar findings, 
Jane’s Strategic Advisory Service in 2009, also reported increased Jihadist 
activities on Facebook and other social media sites.219 
In addition to the use of the Internet and Web 2.0 technologies to plan and 
promote acts of terrorism, it being used by individuals engaged in other malicious 
ventures, such as the series of attacks perpetrated on government and private 
sector websites by “hacktivists” like LulzSec220 and Anonymous. International 
criminal syndicates are also using the Internet to engage in cybercrimes including 
identity theft. As terrorist groups have moved online, social media has become a 
treasure trove of reconnaissance and information for the law enforcement and 
intelligence communities.221 According to published reports, U.S. government 
agencies have been able to monitor222 and confirm terrorist threats online, and 
thus, give protective services advanced warning and the ability to shore up 
vulnerabilities. Government agencies are exploring how they can expand and  
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improve their use of social media. Recently, a FBI initiative to develop an “app” 
that could help to detect suspicious activity garnered considerable attention from 
the privacy and civil liberties communities.223  
2. Crimes and Misdemeanors 
Online communications create new opportunities for entrepreneurs, 
fraudsters, and criminals. The Internet Crime Complaint Center (a partnership of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National White Collar Crime Center, and 
the Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Assistance) is an organization that 
tracks online criminal activity. In the past decade, the Internet Crime Complaint 
Center has seen a substantial increase in both the number of complaints 
received, as well as the dollars lost in these incidents. While over the past 
decade the number one complaint has been about auction fraud, the types of 
crimes complained about have diversified with significant numbers of complaints 
about identity theft, credit card fraud, and computer crimes.224 
In terms of surveillance, however, it is not relevant whether the crime 
transpired online or off. Information available online has become a vital forensics 
tool225 regardless of the location of the crime. Social media has become an 
important law enforcement investigation tool. 226  The 2011 survey of the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police Center for Social Media shows how 
adept law enforcement has become in utilizing social media as a tool. According 
to the report,  
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• “88.1% of agencies surveyed use social media;” 
• 71.1% use it for criminal investigations; 
• 40.1% use it for soliciting tips on crime; and  
• 32% use it for listening or monitoring.227 
Law enforcement has used social media to track suspects.228 The use of 
social media by government officials extends beyond criminal investigations. It 
may be used by government officials in administrative matters to review 
applications submitted by individuals for government services.  
C. DIGITAL DOSSIERS 
Social networking technologies have provided the government with a new 
ability to amass huge profiles on individuals, without it having to engage directly 
in surveillance. With the tremendous amount of information available through 
new commercial databases, online government records (real estate, driver’s 
license), and personal information individuals may post online about themselves, 
governments can create these profiles with ease. These profiles can give law 
enforcement and the intelligence communities a powerful tool. 
With the ready availability of personal information held in the hands of 
commercial entities, the government, and the public at large, dossiers on an 
individual are amassed long before an individual is even born, and may be 
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amassed after an individual has died.229 Technology greatly contributes to the 
compilation of information, by connecting the streams of data held in the hands of 
a multitude of custodians. While not all the information compiled may be correct, 
these digital dossiers can become a major part of an individual’s identity in the 
digital world. Today, the government may obtain more information about its 
citizens by accessing digital data than ever before, and thereby, straining the 
Constitutional protections against unbridled governmental access to an 
individual’s person and papers. 
In the heart of the Cold War, when McCarthyism was gripping the country, 
the government amassed large quantities of information about Americans in the 
name of combating the threat of communism on American soil. Dossiers were 
compiled on individuals in many cases chronicling First Amendment protected 
activities. One of the most famous targets of this action was Dr. Martin Luther 
King Jr.230 When the breadth of this massive surveillance campaign on American 
citizens, as well as the abuses that occurred during the Watergate era became 
known, two Congressional Committees, the Pike (House of Representatives) and 
the Church (Senate) were formed. Their findings resulted in a major overhaul of 
the intelligence community and the issuance of Executive Order 11905, United 
States Intelligence Activities, 231  which mandated an intelligence oversight 
paradigm for the Executive Branch. 
The concerns expressed in the Pike and Church Commissions regarding 
the creation of dossiers on citizens is further heightened in the new information 
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technology era in which the ability to aggregate information is greatly enhanced. 
In today’s digital world, with information pertaining to an individual so readily 
available, “Digital Dossiers” are easier to compile than ever and the information 
compiled is on a quantitatively different scale. What previously took teams of 
agents hours of work, stakeouts, and other resource intensive intelligence 
gathering efforts, 232  can now be acquired by surfing social media sites or 
purchasing reports on individuals from third parties. 
In Born Digital, John Palfrey and Urs Gasser explain that a digital dossier 
may be created on individuals from information they provided about themselves, 
from information derived about them from their participation on social networks, 
such as Facebook, from information compiled from other public sources, as well 
as from non-public sources, such as medical and financial records, and even 
from an individual’s reading lists compiled from public libraries and book sellers. 
Everything that an individual posts online, anything that someone else posts 
about them, anything they ever link to, anyone they ever friend, any purchase 
they ever make, any link they ever click on, any comment they ever “like,” any 
image they ever view or upload, can all become part of their digital dossier—
easily creating a comprehensive picture of the individual. Information contained 
within a digital dossier includes information supplied or available to the individual, 
as well as information that may not be available to include records created from 
non-public government records. These pieces of information can be compiled to 
form a comprehensive picture of an individual’s personality, tastes, interests, 
political and religious positions, or any other aspect of said individual’s life. Once 
information is digitized, it is virtually impossible to delete or correct.  
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Governments can readily obtain more information about its citizens by 
accessing digital data than ever before. The ability to do so led Prof. David 
Solove to muse that it might ultimately result in a  
Kafkaesque world of bureaucracy, where we are increasingly 
powerless and vulnerable, where personal information is not only 
outside our control but also subjected to a bureaucratic process 
that is itself not adequately controlled. This generalized harm 
already exists; we need not wait for specific abuses to occur.233  
Further, Evgeny Morozov in the Net Delusion quips that today, intelligence 
entities such as the KGB can easily obtain information that in the past they could 
only have obtained through the use of torture.234 
Today, digital dossiers are readily available about individuals. For just 
$2.95 per month on Spokeo.com, anyone can purchase information about a 
person’s gender, relationship, real estate holdings, salary, ethnicity, political 
affiliation, religious affiliation, educational level, and occupation.235 Contrast this 
against the labor-intensive efforts to gather intelligence about Dr. Martin Luther 
King Jr. and it is possible to realize how easy it is for today’s government to 
compile dossiers on an individual.  
D. INTERNET FREEDOM 
The Internet promotes American ideals of participatory government, the 
corner stone to a sound democracy, while at the same time, it enhances national 
security by providing situational awareness about country conditions so as to not 
be blindsided when political upheavals occur.236 It has enabled the spread of 
democratic ideals both within this country and around the world. The recent 
events in the Middle East known as the “Arab Spring” were facilitated by social 
media technologies. Individuals in repressive regimes utilized social media to 
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communicate with like-minded people in ways previously only possible at great 
peril to their well-being. It also enabled dissidents to focus international attention 
on these repressive regimes by transmitting news of atrocities committed by 
government forces.237 
The Federal Court in ACLU v. Reno noted the important role the Internet 
has played in U.S. democracy: 
It is no exaggeration to conclude that the Internet has achieved, 
and continues to achieve, the most participatory marketplace of 
mass speech that this country – and indeed the world has yet seen. 
The plaintiffs in these actions correctly describe the “democratizing” 
effects of Internet communication: individual citizens of limited 
means can speak to a worldwide audience on issues of concern to 
them. Federalists and Anti-Federalists may debate the structure of 
their government nightly, but these debates occur in newsgroups or 
chat rooms rather than in pamphlets. Modern-day Luthers still post 
their theses, but to electronic bulletin boards rather than the door of 
the Wittenberg Schlosskirche. More mundane (but from a 
constitutional perspective, equally important) dialogue occurs 
between aspiring artists, or French cooks, or dog lovers, or fly 
fishermen . . . . [T] he Internet may fairly be regarded as a never-
ending worldwide conversation.238 
Given the significant role the Internet plays in fostering democratic ideals, 
on February 15, 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gave a speech entitled 
“Internet Rights and Wrongs: Choice & Challenges in a Networked World.” 
Secretary Clinton called for a “global commitment to Internet freedom” in which 
human rights are protected online as they are off line.239 These freedoms include 
the freedom to assemble and associate in cyberspace. Secretary Clinton noted, 
“connection technologies” provide “on the one hand an accelerant of political, 
social and economic change and on the hand as a means to stifle or extinguish 
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that change.”240 Accordingly, Ms. Clinton declared that Internet freedom is “a 
foreign policy priority . . . one that will only increase in importance in the years to 
come.”241 
The recent events in the Middle East and North Africa illustrate the benefit 
of providing individuals in repressive countries access to the digital tools. The 
revolutionary fervor present throughout the Middle East had been growing for 
some time and would most likely have come to a head even in the absence of 
social networking sites and other connection technologies. Individuals in the 
Middle East took to the street in protest to seek basic freedoms after suffering 
under brutal and totalitarian rule for years. Social media sites provided a forum 
for voices that in the past might have been expressed through the distribution of 
leaflets or by people standing on soap boxes in the town square. Electronic 
communications served as catalysis for the growing opposition to the status quo 
and enabled the unprecedented wave of protest throughout the Middle East.242  
As more and more individuals embrace social media to express their 
thoughts and views, it is imperative to update privacy laws and adopt appropriate 
safeguards to ensure that governmental surveillance and access does not have a 
chilling impact on the “democratizing effects of Internet communications” both at 
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home and abroad. The guarantees of liberty provided by the United States for its 
own citizens are held up as an international model (for good or for bad).243  
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V. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN 
AN ERA OF SOCIAL MEDIA  
Social media by its nature is collaborative. It enables individuals to form 
communities and to be interactive in a digital manner. Today, individuals are 
taking their conversations from their living rooms to cyberspace. Young people 
are living their lives in cyberspace. The fact that their communications are 
occurring in a space owned and operated by a third party does not mean an 
expectation of privacy is any less as articulated by the Supreme Court in Katz. 
Just as the Founding Fathers almost 240 years ago wanted to be secure from 
intrusive governmental acts, so do individuals today. Just as the colonists 
recognized the need for government to engage in actions to protect themselves 
from threats from abroad, so too today do Americans recognize that law 
enforcement and intelligence communities’ need to engage in surveillance to 
detect, thwart and respond to threats from terrorists and other criminal actors.  
Fifty years passed between the invention of the telephone and Olmstead; 
Justice Brandeis discerningly grasped the peril presented by evolving 
communications and surveillance technology as a potential erosion of Fourth 
Amendment protections. Four decades passed between Olmstead and Katz; the 
Supreme Court acknowledged that surveillance laws at that time were 
incongruous with advances in communications. Twenty years passed between 
Katz and ECPA; surveillance laws were again out of alignment with advances in 
communications. 244  Twenty five years have passed since ECPA; 
communications have advanced tremendously so as to confound not only Katz 
but ECPA as well. ECPA's analysis flounders on a 1986 comprehension of 
computer networks that has little relation to today's communications environment.  
 
 
                                            
244 Congress of the United States, Office of Technology Assessment, “Electronic 
Surveillance and Civil Liberties.” 
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Katz's analysis crashes in the regressive logical loop that is Third Party Doctrine. 
Combined, neither affords privacy protections and restraint on government 
surveillance guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.  
A. THE DARK WEB REVISITED  
Grave concern exists that the tracking of terrorist activity may result in a 
degradation in privacy and civil rights. In “Terror on the Internet,”245 Gabriel 
Weimann provides an in-depth analysis of terrorists’ use and presence in 
cyberspace, but argued that although terrorist organizations take advantage of 
the largely “unregulated, anonymous and accessible nature of the Internet,” 
surveillance of the Internet by law enforcement and intelligence community 
entities may result in an infringement of an individual’s privacy. He echoes the 
views of other privacy advocates that it is not the use or monitoring of the Internet 
but rather the lack of judicial oversight that is of concern.246 Understanding the 
potential harm that can be perpetrated upon U.S. society by terrorists using 
Internet technologies to assist in their nefarious aims, Mark Rotenberg, Executive 
Director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, an online civil-liberties 
group, also cautioned that the tools utilized by projects like the Dark Web and 
other more recent efforts of the federal government “to track terrorists can also 
be used to track political opponents.”247 Rotenberg posits that such tools should 
comply with existing privacy laws. As valuable as the Dark Web and similar tools 
may be to detect and thwart terrorist aims, safeguards must be implemented to 
ensure that they do not infringe upon the rights provided by the First and Fourth 
Amendments. 
The American Civil Liberties Union warns that with the increase in 
governmental surveillance efforts on the Internet, America is at risk of becoming 
                                            
245 Gabriel, “Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenge.” 
246 Ibid., 218. 
247 Steven Kotler, “'Dark Web' Project Takes on Cyber-Terrorism,” October 12, 2010, 
http://www.stevenkotler.com/node/87. 
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a “surveillance society.”248 In the days following the tragic events of September 
11, 2001, a greater emphasis was placed on the collection of information 
pertaining to individuals hastened by the weakening of existing regulations on its 
collection and the passage of sweeping legislation like the USA Patriot Act. The 
“commodification” of data by the private sector, which has been collecting all 
means and methods of an individual’s activities online, has only added to the 
move towards a surveillance society.249  
In “Bigger Monster, Weaker Chains,” Jay Stanley and Barry Steinhardt, 
writing on behalf of the ACLU, argue for the passage of new and comprehensive 
privacy laws to provide privacy and civil liberties protections for new and 
emerging technologies:  
In the past, new technologies that threatened our privacy, such as 
telephone wiretapping, were assimilated over time into our society. 
The legal system had time to adapt and reinterpret existing laws, 
the political system had to consider and enact new laws or 
regulations, and the culture had time to absorb the implications of 
the new technology for daily life.250 
However, today, new technologies, such as social networking and cloud 
computing, are being developed at such breakneck speed; laws have failed to 
keep pace. Post-September 11 efforts to protect this country from future acts of 
terrorism and other crimes have resulted in an erosion of privacy and civil 
liberties. Therefore, Stanley and Steinhardt argue that “the reasonable 
expectation of privacy cannot be defined by the power that technology affords the 
government” to perform surveillance and should be reevaluated to take into 
account contemporary circumstances.251 
                                            
248 ACLU, “Is the U.S. Turning into a Surveillance Society? Big Brother is No Longer a 
Fiction,” ACLU Technology and Liberty Program 2003, 2003, http://www.aclu.org/technology-and-
liberty/big-brother-no-longer-fiction-aclu-warns-new-report. 
249 Jay Stanley and Barry Steinhardt, “Bigger Monster, Weaker Chains,” ACLU 2003, 2003, 
http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/privacy/bigger_weaker.pdf. 
250 Ibid., 16. 
251 Ibid., 17. 
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B. KATZ REVISITED: THIRD PARTY DOCTRINE: A REGRESSIVE 
LOGICAL LOOP 
Katz’s Third Party Doctrine is particularly troubling because today most 
data residing in the digital world is transmitted or stored on third party 
intermediary sites. The application of the Third Party Doctrine to data transmitted 
and communicated in social media or stored in the cloud would arguably provide 
the government with such unfettered access it would negate the protections 
envisioned by the Fourth Amendment. Today, comments made on Facebook can 
be likened to parlor talk in which friends can betray confidence, and thus, less 
privacy is afforded. However, just because they can, does this mean that the 
government gets to enjoy fruits of third parties? The limits of what is 
constitutionally permissible should not be defined by what is technically feasible. 
The Third Party Doctrine, taken to its logical conclusion, has the potential to 
deprive all electronic communications occurring in social media and stored in the 
cloud of any Fourth Amendment protection,252 and therefore, it must be modified. 
John Palfrey in “The Public and the Private at the United States Border with 
Cyberspace” has argued it is time to “rethink legal protections for citizens from 
state surveillance in a digital age as a result of this third-party data problem.”253 
As Supreme Court Justice Sotomayor also posited in U.S. v. Jones, given 
the rapid advancements in technology, it is time to reevaluate the Third Party 
Doctrine and the legal interpretation that an individual has no reasonable 
expectation in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties: 
This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal 
a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the 
course of carrying out mundane tasks. . . I would not assume that 
all information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public 
for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth 
Amendment protection.254 
                                            
252 Strandburg, “Home, Home on the Web, and Other Fourth Amendment Implications of 
Technosocial Change.” 
253 Palfrey, “The Public and the Private at the United States Border with Cyberspace.” 
254 Jones, 565 U.S. slip at 5-6 (2012). 
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Recently, the propriety of the Department of Homeland Security’s monitoring of 
social media and the impact it has on constitutionally guaranteed free speech 
was the subject of a hearing before the House Homeland Security Committee’s 
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence. 255  Chairman Patrick 
Meehan, while acknowledging the importance of following leads “wherever they 
may take investigators” in keeping this country safe from terrorists and other 
criminal actors, nevertheless questioned whether “collecting, analyzing, and 
disseminating private citizens’ comments could have a chilling effect on individual 
privacy rights and people’s freedom of speech and dissent against their 
government.”256 Today, with the availability of information and the ease of access, 
it is more important then ever to take legislative, administrative and judicial steps 
to ensure that an appropriate balance is struck between the government’s 
intelligence needs against an individual’s privacy and civil liberties. 
C. ECPA REVISITED 
Twenty five years after the passage of ECPA, calls have been made for its 
reform. 257  The evolution of electronic communications has occurred with 
breakneck speed, with the Internet being widely adapted by modern society. Web 
2.0 and the social media enable functionality, interactivity, and exposure that did 
not exist at the time of ECPA’s passage in 1986. Although ECPA was a forward-
looking statute at the time of its passage, its technology centric approach 
resulted in the statute being limited to technology as it existed twenty five years 
                                            
255 DHS Monitoring of Social Networking and Media: Enhancing Intelligence Gathering and 
Ensuring Privacy: Hearing before Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee 




257 See, e.g., The Electronic Communications Act: Government Perspectives on Protecting 
Privacy in the Digital Age. Hearing of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, April 
6, 2011; ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Location Based Technologies and Services, 
Hearing of the House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, 
and Civil Liberties, June 24, 2010; Electronic Communications Privacy Act Reform. Hearing of the 
House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil 
Liberties, Serial No. 111–98, 111th Cong., May 5, 2010. 
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ago. Applying ECPA to today’s social networking technologies is like using a 
sledgehammer to hang a digital picture frame. The result has been awkward and 
inconsistent judicial interpretations that have left the public with little to no 
expectation of privacy.258 As such, many believe that EPCA no longer provides 
sufficient clarity to govern today’s technological abilities and are calling for a 
statutory fix to afford Fourth Amendment like protections to an individual’s 
“papers and effects” now stored in the cloud.259  
Since 1986, e-mail has become a dominant means for communicating in 
the country. Web 2.0 enabled an individual to communicate in a collaborative 
manner with larger communities. With the price of storage becoming negligible, it 
is not uncommon to retain many if not all e-mails and other communications 
indefinitely on third party provider servers. Applying ECPA’s 25-year-old 
standards to today’s digital communications deprives users of the Fourth 
Amendment like protections Congress had intended. 
With the growth in popularity of Web 2.0 technologies, and with more and 
more computing activities moving to the cloud, the issue of to what extent an 
individual possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy when using a social 
media tool is not well settled. The courts are now addressing how Fourth 
Amendment privacy protections apply in the new evolving social media 
environment. A district court in California confronted this issue for the first time in 
2010 and held that private messages sent using Facebook or MySpace do in fact 
                                            
258 See City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S.Ct. 2619 (2010). Demonstrating the Supreme 
Court’s reluctance to infer Fourth Amendment protections to nascent electronic communications. 
“The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of 
emerging technology before its role in society has become clear.” See also Crispin v. Christian 
Audigier, Inc., 717 F.Supp.2d 965 (C.D.Ca. 2010) (holding Stored Communication Act applies to 
Facebook messaging and may apply to Facebook wall posts given certain privacy settings). 
259 The Digital Due Process Coalition, whose members include members of the technology 
and commerce sectors, such as Amazon, AOL, Microsoft, Center for Democracy and Technology, 
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fall under the protections of the Stored Communications Act that limits the 
government’s ability to force Internet Service Provider to “disclose information in 
their possession about their customers and subscribers.” 260  Similarly, items 
posted on an individual’s wall may also enjoy the protections of the Stored 
Communications Act, but only to the extent that an individual invoked the sites’ 
privacy protections. 
Many believe that EPCA fails to provide sufficient clarity to govern today’s 
transformed social media environment and are calling for a statutory revision. In 
2010, Congress held hearings in which it explored the possibility of reforming 
ECPA.261 Testimony not only focused on the need to fix the legendary “lack of 
clarity” provided by ECPA but also on the need to bring the law into alignment 
with the development in technology and societal expectations of privacy. At the 
September 22, 2010, Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, Committee Chairman 
Patrick Leahy stated that '[b]ringing this privacy law into the Digital Age will be 
one of Congress's greatest challenges . . . the 'ECPA is a law that is often 
hampered by conflicting privacy standards that create uncertainty and confusion 
for law enforcement, the business community and American consumers.”262 On 
May 19, 2011, Senator Leahy introduced the ECPA Amendments Act of 2011. 
The ECPA amendment eliminates the distinctions between 
communications in transit, communications in storage, as well as the between e-
mails and other forms of electronic communications. It decreases the time before 
law enforcement (LE) is required to provide notification to the subject that a 
search has occurred and requires LE to obtain a warrant to access mobile phone 
locational data. In particular, the Act would make the following modifications: 
                                            
260 Crispin v. Audigier, Inc., 717 F.Supp.2d 965. Court opined that because Facebook and 
MySpace provide private messaging or e-mail services, as well as electronic storage, they qualify 
as both ECS and RCS providers, and as such, warrant the protections of the SCA. This decision 
is binding only in the Central District of California but may be persuasive in other courts that begin 
to confront similar issues. 
261 ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Cloud Computing. 
262 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Promoting Security and Protecting Privacy 
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• Voluntary disclosure by service providers—with limited exception, 
service providers would be prohibited from voluntarily disclosing the 
contents of customers’ electronic communications to the 
government. 
• Compelled disclosure of the contents of communications—
eliminates the 180-day rule; would require a warrant for the 
disclosure of the contents of any electronic communications 
regardless of how long the communications had been stored.  
• Disclosure of transactional data—an administrative or grand jury 
subpoena would be required for government access to 
transactional data that includes customer name, address, session 
time records, length of service information, subscriber number and 
temporarily assigned network address, and means and source of 
payment information. 
• Notice—the government would be required to provide notice (a 
copy of the warrant and any other pertinent information) to the 
affected customer within three days. Delivery of the required notice 
could be delayed for up to 90 days upon a showing that notice 
would endanger national security. 
• New protections for geolocation information—governmental access 
to contemporaneous geolocation information defined as “any 
information concerning the location of an electronic 
communications device that is in whole or in part generated by or 
derived from the operation or use of the electronic communications 
device,” is permitted only pursuant to a warrant or express consent 
of the owner of the mobile device or application, except in certain 
emergency circumstances. Access to historical communications is 
permissible pursuant to a warrant, consent or court order upon a 
showing of “specific and articulable facts that. . . there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the information 
[communications] . . . is relevant and material to an ongoing 
criminal investigation. 
The ECPA amendment eliminates the distinctions between 
communications in transit, communications in storage, as well as the between e-
mails and other forms of electronic communications. It decreases the time before 
LE is required to provide notification to the subject that a search has occurred. 
Further, it requires LE to obtain a warrant to access mobile phone locational data. 
Until such time as Congress affords some statutory relief, the lack of clear 
standards for governmental access to information, communicated in social media 
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and stored on third party servers, places service providers on the front lines of 
the debate. Many major service providers, such as Microsoft, state in their 
privacy policies that they will provide content to law enforcement or intelligence 
entities in response to lawful requests. However, the determination of whether a 
request is valid and permissible, and that the government has procured the 
proper level of process, is left up to the companies and their legal counsel to 
determine.263 In addition, in many circumstances, the individual may never know 
that a request was made for information and the extent to which it has been 
honored.264 The quandary third party service providers find themselves in further 
highlights the ever increasing need to strike the correct balance between Fourth 
Amendment expectations of privacy with the law enforcement and intelligence 
communities’ need to obtain pertinent information to detect, prevent and thwart 
potential terrorist and other criminal acts.265 Striking the correct balance is now 
more critical then ever as Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan reminded, 
“the needs of law enforcement stand in constant tension with the Constitution’s 
protections of the individual. . . It is precisely the predictability of these pressures 
that counsels a resolute loyalty to Constitutional safeguards.266 
                                            
263 An example occurred in 2005 when the Department of Justice attempted to use a 
subpoena to compel the disclosure of one week and one million randomly selected web 
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and Gadgets, January 19, 1996, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10925344/ns/technology_and_science-
tech_and_gadgets/t/google-rebuffs-feds-over-access-search-data/. 
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Privacy and civil liberties are at a crossroad in cyberspace. This moment 
in Fourth Amendment history is very reminiscent of the period leading up to the 
enactment of ECPA during which U.S. Circuit Court Judge Richard Posner 
chided Congress to take action to bring the Wiretap Act into alignment with the 
current state of technology. Posner quipped, “we would think it a very good thing 
if Congress responded to the issues discussed in this opinion by amending Title 
III to bring television surveillance within its scope . . . judges are not authorized to 
amend statutes even to bring them up to date.”267 ECPA is obsolete. Patches 
downloaded from Congress are unlikely to restore functionality. ECPA is out of 
alignment with social media communications and societal expectations related to 
it. The statute no longer achieves Fourth Amendment objectives of establishing 
appropriate restraints on government surveillance and protection of privacy.  
D. BRANDEIS REVISITED 
More than a century has passed since Louis Brandeis and his law partner 
Samuel Warren advocated for the recognition of the right to privacy in common 
law. Brandeis and Warren observed first hand the impact new and emerging 
technology can have on an individual’s privacy. Responding to newly emerging 
practices of journalists, in particular photojournalists “invading the sacred 
precincts of private and domestic life and [whose] numerous mechanical devices 
threaten to make good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall 
be proclaimed from the house-tops,’”268 they authored the seminal law review 
article, “The Right to Privacy.” The “Right to Privacy” set forth a framework for 
establishing legal protections to remedy intrusions on an individual’s privacy that 
is still pertinent today. They argued that the ever-evolving instrument of common 
law should be evoked to respond to “recent inventions and business practices” 
that enabled the intrusion of one’s “thoughts, emotions and sensations,” and 
                                            
267 U.S. v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1984) held that the making of a bomb was not oral 
or wire communications under the 1968 Federal Wiretap. Therefore, the act did not require the 
government to obtain a warrant to videotape the defendant’s in the act of bomb making. 
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bestow upon the individual, legal recognition of “the right to be left alone.”269 The 
concerns they raised and their call for judicial intervention in the face of intrusive 
new technologies struck a chord that continues to reverberate today in the era of 
social media. 
Several years after Brandeis wrote “The Right to Privacy,” he became a 
Supreme Court Justice and once again was confronted with the intrusions to 
privacy caused by emerging technologies, this time brought about by the 
government. In the dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. U.S., he asserted that an 
individual has a Constitutional right to be left alone as against the government. 
Brandeis argued the Court must recognize the Constitution as a living document. 
The framers of the Constitution could not have anticipated the advancements 
that had occurred in technology since the colonial era nor did they intend for the 
protections afforded by the Bill of Rights to be limited to those threats that existed 
in the early days of this nation. Brandeis cautioned that “discovery and invention 
have made it possible for the Government, by means far more effective than 
stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in the 
closet.”270  
With the advancements in technology that became available in Brandeis’s 
lifetime and those that he intuitively knew were yet to come, he warned of the 
need to ensure that the protections of the Fourth Amendment transcended time, 
as was the intention of the drafters of the Constitution. In 2012, Brandeis’ words 
ring as true as ever. In an era in which personal effects that used to be secured 
in a desk behind the walls of an individual’s home, are now communicated and 
stored in cyberspace, an individual has no less protection against unfettered 
access by the government. As Brandeis admonished, the law must continue to 
evolve and keep pace with new and emerging technologies. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
Privacy is one of the most cherished values of a society. It is essential to a 
strong democracy. The Founding Fathers responding to abuses of the Crown 
provided protections to the individual as against the government in the Bill of 
Rights. The Fourth Amendment recognized the need of the government to take 
appropriate action to protect its citizens even if it meant engaging in surveillance. 
However, consistent with the Constitutional framework embedded in this 
country’s system of government, a judicial warrant premised upon probable 
cause must be obtained to place a check against governmental excesses.  
Throughout this country’s history, a constant cycle of technological 
developments have challenged an individual’s privacy and civil liberties, 
legislative attempts to rectify gaps in the protections of those civil liberties, and 
judicial efforts to align societal expectations of Constitutional rights with new and 
emerging technologies, even when the state of the law fails to keep pace.  
Sadly, on the morning of September 11, 2001, “a day of unprecedented 
shock and suffering in the history of the United States,”271 when nearly three 
3,000 people died, “the largest single loss of life from an enemy attack on 
American soil,”272 the bounds of the protections of the Fourth Amendment were 
challenged. Greater demands were placed on the law enforcement and 
intelligence communities to detect, prevent, thwart and respond to attacks 
against Americans and their interest. They, like a growing number of Americans, 
turned to the Internet.  
Since September 11, society has begun to adopt social networking 
technologies to communicate with loves ones, form communities with individuals 
with similar interests, and to store their personal effects in the cloud. Similarly, 
terrorists and other criminal actors have also embraced social networking 
                                            
271 The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9-11 
Commission Report (New York; W.W. Norton & Company, 2003), xv. 
272 Ibid. 
  101
technologies, and as such, they have provided a treasure trove of information for 
the government. The Artificial Intelligence Dark Web project and Professor 
Gabriel Weinmann documented the use of social media technologies by terrorist 
organizations to recruit new adherents, raise funds, plan and execute acts of 
terror, and to spread propaganda about their endeavors and their ideologies.  
As effective as surveillance of the Internet may be, it must not be 
undertaken at the expense of individual privacy and civil liberties. Existing privacy 
and civil rights law have failed to keep pace with advancements in technology. 
With the advent of social media and cloud computing, laws have once again 
failed to keep pace with the rapid advancements in technologies. Currently, this 
period of time is reminiscent of the days leading up to the passage of ECPA 
when as observed by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment: 
In the last 20 years, there has been a virtual revolution in the 
technology relevant to electronic surveillance. Advances in 
electronics, semiconductors, computers, imaging, databases, and 
related technologies have greatly increased the technical options 
for surveillance activities . . . The existing statutory framework and 
judicial interpretations thereof do not adequately cover new 
electronic surveillance applications. The Fourth amendment–which 
protects “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures’ ‘—was written at a time when people conducted their 
affairs in a simple, direct, and personalized fashion. . . public policy 
on the use of information technology to electronically monitor 
individual movements, actions, and communications has been 
based on a careful balancing of the civil liberty versus law 
enforcement or investigative interests. New technologies . . . have 
outstripped the existing statutory framework for balancing these 
interests.273 
Private papers are now stored in the cloud and not behind the four walls of 
an individual’s home as they were in the days of the Founding Fathers. However, 
as suggested by Justice Brandeis in “The Right to Privacy,” and later in the 
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Olmstead dissent, the principles enshrined in the Fourth Amendment protecting 
against unrestrained governmental access to personal papers were not meant to 
lay dormant in the 1700s but must continue to progress with advancements in 
technology. Once again it is necessary to heed the cry to action of Justice 
Possner and seek statutory guidance that strikes an appropriate balance 
between an individual’s privacy and civil liberties and the government’s need for 
information to keep this country safe.  
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